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CARRIED INTEREST AND BEYOND: THE NATURE
OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT AND ITS
INTERNATIONAL TAX IMPLICATIONS
Young Ran (Christine) Kim*
Private equity funds (PEFs) eliminate entity-level taxation by using
pass-through entities. They further minimize their investors’ tax liability by
taking the position that profits distributed to both general partners (GPs) and
limited partners (LPs) are passive portfolio investment income and taxed
preferentially. The taxation of carried interest at low capital gains rates is
likely the most infamous loophole. This article challenges such tax position
and instead argues that the nature of PEF investment is active. PEFs seek to
influence their portfolio companies to increase their value so that they
actively manage the companies by acquiring at least 10% of their stock,
which does not conceptually accord with portfolio investments. The proposed
theory that PEFs are active is further supported by recent proposals on
carried interest as well as cases and rulings holding that PEFs are involved
in a “trade or business.”
This article also considers international tax implications of the new
theory: it switches the primary tax jurisdiction to levy tax on PEFs’ crossborder income. This change may be justified for GPs who erode the tax base
of a source country, but less justified for LPs because of their genuinely
passive involvement, notwithstanding that LPs’ tax-exempt or nonresident
status enables GPs’ abusive activities. Finally, determining the true nature
of PEF investment and reforming PEF tax accordingly would increase
worldwide revenue without significantly reducing the revenue of traditional
residence countries, because the traditional residence countries, such as the
United States, are also major source countries in the PEF industry.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Private equity funds (PEFs) essentially eliminate entity-level taxation,
which would have occurred had it used a C corporation to pool and invest the
capital, by taking the form of pass-through entities, particularly a limited
partnership.1 In addition to enjoying partnership tax, PEFs further take the
traditional position that profits distributed from the partnership vehicle to
both general partners (GPs) and limited partners (LPs) are passive investment
incomes, such as capital gains.2Since the flexibility of partnership tax allows
for the difference in allocation of partnership profits and the underlying
ownership of the partnership interest,3 the PEF market has an established
practice of allocating 20% of profits, as carried interest, to GPs as a reward
for their service to the fund on top of the return to their capital interest.4
Carried interest has been called the most famous tax loophole of PEFs,5
allowing private equity firms to pay tax on their income at lower capital gains
rates. Recent proposals for carried interest suggest recasting the carried
interest portion of a GP’s profit from capital gains to ordinary income,
specifically as compensation for services of the GP.6 These proposals have
been circulating for many years,7 and they have gained bipartisan support. In
fact, reforming the tax treatment of carried interest was one of the few issues
that both then-candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump agreed upon
during the 2016 presidential election.8 However, although the Trump
1

DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS2269, TAXATION OF HEDGE FUND
2 (2014).
2
Id. at 5.
3
See I.R.C. § 704(b) (providing that a partner’s distributive share of income and
distribution may be different from the partner’s interest in the partnership if the partnership
agreement provides as such); RICHARD M. LIPTON ET AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 121 (3d ed.
2012) (explaining that I.R.C. § 704(b) allows flexibility for determining partners’ allocable
share of partnership income and distributions).
4
Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
5
Victor Fleischer, The Top 10 Private Equity Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013,
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/the-top-10-private-equity-loopholes/?_r=0.
6
See infra text accompanying notes 185–200.
7
Congress started discussing the issue in 2007. See Steven M. Rosenthal, Taxing
Private Equity Funds as Corporate “Developers,” 138 TAX NOTES 361, 361 (2013).
8
Melissa Mittelman, With Close Trump Ties, Private Equity Eyes Tax, Financial
Reform, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 19, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS
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administration first sought to close the carried interest loophole in the recent
tax reform,9 the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 did not effectively close the
loophole.10
Carried interest is not the only tax technique that a taxpayer may use to
minimize tax burden. A recent article addressing private equity’s “tax game”
of using 2% management fees and expense deductions illustrates other ways
to reduce tax liability and suggests how to correct the issue.11
More fundamentally, the discussion on carried interest and management
fees raises questions about the nature of investments in private equity.12
Traditionally, investors in PEFs are treated as passive investors, as opposed
to active investors who manage and control the business to generate business
profits. Thus, fund investors (both GPs and LPs) have been treated as
portfolio investors, who are not involved in the business operation but simply
receive passive income from their investment. International finance and tax
policy literature agrees with this view and classifies cross-border investments
by PEFs as foreign portfolio investments.13
However, this article argues that such a view is at odds with the true
nature of PEF investment: PEFs seek to influence their portfolio companies
in order to increase their value, so that the PEFs actively manage and operate
the portfolio companies by acquiring at least 10% of the stock of the portfolio
companies.14 Given that the foreign portfolio investment refers to the
01-19/with-close-trump-ties-private-equity-eyes-tax-financial-reform.
9
Rebecca Shabad, Trump Says His Administration Is Targeting Carried Interest
Loophole in Tax Reform, CBS NEWS, May 1, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trumpsays-his-administration-is-targeting-carried-interest-loophole-in-tax-reform/.
10
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 applies a three-year holding period in order for
investment managers to enjoy long-term capital gains rates on carried interest. Pub. L. No.
115-97, § 13309, 131 Stat. 2054, 2130 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1061(a)(2)). However,
in many cases the effect is not likely material because private equity funds often hold
investments longer than three years before realizing gains. Jason Factor & Meyer Fedida, Tax
Cuts & Jobs Act: Considerations for Funds, CLEARY GOTTLIEB ALERT MEMORANDUM (Jan. 2,
2018),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organizearchive/cgsh/files/2017/publications/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-2017/updates-1-2-18/tcjasummary—private-equity-jan-2.pdf. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.
11
See Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of Private Equity Tax Games (U.N.C. Legal
Stud., Res. Paper No. 2524593, Nov. 14, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524593.
12
See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 7.
13
See, e.g., PETER CORNELIUS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN PRIVATE EQUITY: ASSET
ALLOCATION, MARKETS, AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 155 (2011); infra text accompanying note
146.
14
See, e.g., JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL,
PRIVATE EQUITY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 1–3, 1–6 (2013) (providing that
PEFs’ active involvement in managing portfolio companies distinguish PEFs from other types
of investing).

2018

Carried Interest and Beyond

425

investment owning less than 10% of the foreign entity to indicate its passive
nature,15 the nature of PEF investment does not conceptually accord with that
of portfolio investment. Carried interest proposals signal a challenge to the
traditional position for GPs in tax law by admitting their active involvement
in the investment. Moreover, the recent Sun Capital case decided in the First
Circuit16 and an Internal Revenue Service (Service) ruling,17 which held that
private equity is involved in a “trade or business,” the term of art describing
active business in tax law, further complicates the traditional view of private
equity investments as passive investments.
The concerns that PEFs are abused to minimize the tax liability of private
equity firms and investors18 need more attention in the context of recent
developments. Business income that used to be earned from C corporations
has been shifted to pass-through entities over the last two decades, and the
United States has likely lost substantial tax revenue due to such changes in
the origin of business income.19 Business activity from pass-through entities
was low in 1980, when pass-through entities produced only 20.7% of all
business income, and had more than doubled to 54.2% by 2011.20
However, discourse on private equity tax is still limited to domestic
matters. There is scant research analyzing international tax aspects of PEFs’
cross-border investment, despite the dramatic increase in international capital
flows. Indeed, PEFs invest all over the world. American private equity houses
were in charge of 32% of international buyout investments between 2003 and
2007.21 During the same period, 34% of the investments from the European
private equity market were deployed in nondomestic countries.22 Recent
proposals on carried interest and the challenge to the traditional tax position
of PEFs as passive investors have significant implications for international
tax as well, one of which could be changes the primary tax jurisdictions
among relevant countries.
15

The Internal Revenue Code (Code) assumes that the dividing line between foreign
direct investment and foreign portfolio investment is 10% of the investee entity. See infra Part
III.B.
16
Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013). For more discussion on the Sun Capital case, see infra
Part IV.B.2.
17
I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201501013 22 (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/201501013.pdf. For more discussion, see infra Part V.C.1.
18
See, e.g., MARPLES, supra note 1, at 5 (indicating that current tax treatment harms
horizontal equity between fund managers and other taxpayers); Fleischer, supra note 5.
19
Michael Cooper et al., Business in the United States: Who Owns It and How Much
Tax Do They Pay 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W21651, 2015),
https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/13689.html.
20
Id.
21
ELI TALMOR & FLORIN VASVARI, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY 8 (2011).
22
Id.
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Since the 1920s, countries have reached a consensus in international tax
to allocate the primary tax jurisdiction of active business income to source
countries where the income is produced and allocate the passive or portfolio
income to residence countries.23 According to this consensus, a GP’s income,
such as carried interest, and an LP’s income are both subject to the residence
country’s primary tax jurisdiction.24 However, the policy alternatives
recognizing the active nature of PEF investment would treat the income of
GPs and LPs as active income, subject to the source country’s primary tax
jurisdiction, thus strengthening source-based taxation.25 This article asserts
that a change that strengthens the source-based taxation in international tax
may be justified for a GP’s income, because a GP actively erodes the tax base
of source country by converting the character of income (carried interest) as
well as eroding the tax base of portfolio companies (via management fee
waiver and expense allocation).26 On the other hand, an LP’s income would
be subject to source-based taxation for being active, because a GP’s active
performance is attributable to the fund under the laws of partnership and
partnership tax.27 Furthermore, an LP’s tax-exempt or nonresident status is
essential to enable a GP’s abusive activities. Nonetheless, strengthening
source-based taxation on an LP’s income may be less justified considering
its genuinely passive involvement in PEF investments. Thus, this article
urges policymakers to consider both the public goods that LPs may provide
and the alternative perspective challenging the tax consequences of LPs when
deciding the proper partnership tax rule for LPs in PEF investment.
It might be tempting to think that since recent discourse on policy
alternatives suggests changing a portion of partners’ income from passive to
active, there would be a revenue loss for residence countries with primary tax
jurisdiction for passive income and a revenue gain for source countries with
primary tax jurisdiction for active business income. Given that the United
States is a major residence country like other developed countries,28 this
23

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (1996); Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing
International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 556–75 (2003); Michael J. Graetz &
Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U. S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021,
1023, 1066–89 (1997). For more discussion on the allocation of international tax jurisdictions,
see infra text accompanying notes 161–63.
24
Avi-Yonah, supra note 23; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23; Graetz & O’Hear,
supra note 23.
25
See infra Part V.
26
See infra Part V.A.1.
27
See infra text accompanying notes 233–40.
28
Michael J. Graetz, David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261,
264 (2001) (noting that the United States could be simply viewed as a capital exporting country
(“residence country” in international tax terminology) in the 20th century but not if it is both a
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could raise the concern that tax reform of private equity could reduce U.S.
tax revenue if it expands to the international context. This article
demonstrates, however, that tax reform of private equity would not
significantly reduce the revenue of traditional residence countries, and yet it
would significantly increase the revenue of source countries, thus increasing
total worldwide revenue. Finally, since the United States is the biggest source
country as well as the major residence country in the PEF industry,29
determining the true nature of PEF investments and reforming PEF tax
accordingly would not harm the United States’s revenue domestically or
internationally.
In sum, this article analyzes international tax implications of recent tax
reforms and rulings on private equity. Part II describes the growth and
globalization of PEFs. Part III argues that PEFs cannot be treated as pure
passive investments due to the hybrid nature of their investment activity,
which has the form of a passive investment, but is substantively active
investment. However, the extent to which PEF investments should be treated
as active is a difficult consideration. In order to understand the nature of PEF
investments, tax scholars should compare other types of cross-border
investments, thereby setting a new benchmark for taxing PEF investments.
Part IV discusses the details of the alternatives to PEF taxation. In addition
to the recent proposals on carried interest and management fees, a more
ambitious position worth considering is to treat a PEF as a “trade or
business.” Part V analyzes the international tax implications of the various
proposals. Part VI demonstrates how the revenue of each country would be
affected by the representative alternatives. Part VII concludes.
II. THE GROWTH AND GLOBALIZATION OF PEFS
A. Background of Private Equity
Private equity has grown significantly over the last two decades.30
Private equity is “responsible for up to a quarter of global M&A activity and
as much as half of the leveraged loan issues in the capital markets,”31 and

large capital importer (“source country” in international tax terminology) and capital
exporter).
29
See infra Part II.C.
30
A partner at Texas Pacific Group, which ranked 5th in 2014 in The Private Equity
International 300’s top 50 list, PRIVATE EQUITY INTERNATIONAL, The PEI 300 2014 (2014)
[hereinafter PEI 300 2014], described the newsworthy feature of private equity deals as
follows: “You can’t pick up the paper or turn on the TV and not hear about [private
equity] . . . .” Andrew Ross Sorkin, Of Private Equity, Politics and Income Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/business/yourmoney/ 11deal.html.
31
TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 3.
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many commentators now call it a “new industry.”32 However, because of the
private nature of the market, “it is extremely challenging for the outsider to
understand and form a view on the workings of the industry.”33
The name “private equity” refers to investments in securities which are
not usually listed in the public markets.34 In fact, a raison d’être of the private
equity industry is that it allows companies to access capital that is not
available on the public market for various reasons.35 On the flip side,
investors in PEFs have a propensity to pursue relatively “high risk and high
illiquidity” investments in a market that is currently lightly-regulated.36
Generally, PEFs are divided into two categories: buyout funds and
venture capital funds. Both buyout funds and venture capital funds share
similar investment structures, using special purpose funds (or limited
partnerships) which are established for a particular investment opportunity
with a finite life.37 Investment strategies for buyout funds and venture capital
funds, on the other hand, are quite different. Buyout funds’ targets are mostly
“established and matured companies.”38 They raise funds through both debt
and equity financing, and they are larger in size than venture capital funds.
Venture capital funds focus on “startups, young and high-growth
companies”39 and do not use debt capital financing. But for both funds, the
general partners or managers of the funds take an active role in the operation
of portfolio companies, often taking seats on the board of portfolio companies
to execute and monitor their business strategies.40 Usually, when successful,
a PEF exits a portfolio company after three to seven years.41
The origin of private equity dates back to the 1930s and 1940s, when
wealthy families started investing in venture capital firms.42 In the 1980s,
32
Id.; see also Robert Cressy, Federico Munari & Alessandro Malipiero, Playing to
Their Strengths? Evidence that Specialization in the Private Equity Industry Confers
Competitive Advantage, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 647, 648 (2007).
33
TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21.
34
Id. at 4.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 21.
38
Id. at 4.
39
Id.
40
Id.; see also LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–3 (explaining that such active
involvement significantly distinguishes PEFs from other types of investment, such as portfolio
investments by a mutual fund or other money manager).
41
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–3
42
Wealthy families, such as the Rockefellers, Vanderbilts, and Bessemers, started
investing in venture capital firms, such as J.H. Whitney & Company and American Research
& Development Corporation. Since small business investment companies (SBICs) were
licensed in 1958, venture capital became very popular in the 1960s, resulting in the
development of limited liability partnerships (LLPs). The big boost for venture capital took
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today’s big private equity firms43 started acquiring companies with leverage
financing. By the late 1980s, private equity had emerged as a major asset
class but became notorious for its leveraged buyouts of famous companies.44
Private equity has subsequently experienced three major waves of
expansions,45 followed by the global financial crisis in 2008.
The aftermath of the global financial crisis affected the private equity
industry as well. Because private equity is private in nature, it has been
exempted from many regulatory oversight procedures, such as reporting and
registration with financial regulators.46 However, two recent statutes — the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 201047 in
the United States and the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers48 in Europe — now place additional requirements and restrictions
on private equity, and more transparency is expected in the industry.49
B. Economics, Governance, Operation, and Basic Tax Issues
The basic structure of a PEF is illustrated in Figure 1 below. PEFs are
typically organized as one or more limited partnerships,50 established for the

place in the 1970s because of the reduction of capital gains tax and the enactment of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by permitting pension funds to invest in
PEFs. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 5.
43
The first of today’s big private equity firms, Warburg Pincus, came up in the late
1960s. Id. Another large private equity firm today, Thomas Lee Partners, was founded in 1974
and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) was founded in 1978. Warburg Pincus is ranked at
fourteenth and KKR at second in PEI 300 2014. PEI 300 2014, supra note 30.
44
When KKR bought the Safeway Stores in 1986, it borrowed 97% of $4.8bn that the
deal cost. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 6. For more history written by journalists
about how the private equity started, see DAVID CAREY & JOHN E. MORRIS, KING OF CAPITAL:
THE REMARKABLE RISE, FALL, AND RISE AGAIN OF STEVE SCHWARZMAN AND BLACKSTONE
(2012); JOSH KOSMAN, THE BUYOUT OF AMERICA: HOW PRIVATE EQUITY WILL CAUSE THE
NEXT GREAT CREDIT CRISIS (2010).
45
The first expansion of private equity was in the 1980s with many high-yield junk
bonds. The second expansion was in the 1990s with the dotcom technology bubble. And the
third expansion was in the mid-2000s with the buyout boom and credit bubble. All three
expansions collapsed when the relevant bubble burst. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at
6.
46
Id. at 13.
47
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 780).
48
Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1.
49
TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 13–14.
50
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–13 (explaining that the choice of a partnership or
LLC is to avoid entity-level taxation). The U.S.-based PEFs are commonly registered in
Delaware as LPs, but some are registered in Cayman Islands or Bermuda. TALMOR & VASVARI,
supra note 21, at 27. The U.K. based PEFs are commonly registered in Jersey or Guernsey.
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specific purpose of raising investment.51 In the early days of PEF investment,
LPs were usually individuals. Now, LPs are largely institutional investors,
such as pension funds, university endowments, financial institutions (mostly
insurance companies), sovereign wealth funds, and high net-worth
individuals.52 Retail investors cannot access private equity investments
unless they invest in listed private equity funds,53 so the number of limited
partners per private equity investment is typically smaller compared to that
of mutual funds. LPs are mostly tax-exempt organizations and thus provide
important tax planning opportunities for PEFs.54 Investors become LPs by
making a “commitment” of a certain sizable amount of capital to the
partnership, which is “a legally binding promise to deliver [their] pro rata
share of the aggregate fund commitments as and when they are asked for” by
GPs.55
The private equity firms become GPs themselves or affiliates of GPs,
responsible for all investment-related matters in PEFs.56 GPs typically make
a small capital contribution, usually 1% to 5% of the fund’s capital,57 and
promise management services in exchange for a “profit” (carried interest) in
the partnership and “fees” (management fees).58 There is an industry standard
practice, called “two and twenty:” 2% of the committed capital as an annual
management fee and 20% of the fund’s future profit (or carried interest).59
GPs can receive such carried interest after investors have received a priority

51

Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 361; see also TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21.
TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21–22; Fleischer, supra note 4, at 17–18.
53
TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21; Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The
Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5–6 (2008); David Cho, Firms Go Private in
Search of Deeper Pockets, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/01/30/AR2007013002038.html.
54
Fleischer, supra note 4, at 13–14, 17–18.
55
TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21–22.
56
Id. at 22.
57
Fleischer, supra note 4, at 8; Lily Batchelder, What Is Carried Interest and How
Should
It
Be
Taxed?,
TAX
POL’Y
CTR.:
BRIEFING
BOOK
(2012),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/business/carried-interest.cfm.
58
Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 361–62.
59
Fleischer, supra note 4, at 3. Such carried interest combined with the clawback
provision gives a powerful financial incentive to GPs. See infra note 60 and accompanying
text.
52

2018

Carried Interest and Beyond

431

rate of return (or a hurdle rate),60 subject to a retrospective “clawback.”61
PEFs acquire target companies or portfolio companies with capital
received from LPs and GPs, and with debt-financing when they plan a
leveraged buyout.62 Seeking control of the portfolio company and an active
role in managing and operating the company, PEFs acquire “a very
substantial equity stake”63 and/or appoint their employees to serve on the
boards of the company.64 They then improve “the operations, governance,
capital structure, and strategic position” of the portfolio company.65 From the
beginning of their investments, PEFs have exit plans, either to resell the
company or make an initial public offering.66 Income and sale proceeds
arising from the exit are distributed to investors, rather than reinvested.67 The
fund in most cases dissolves within eight to twelve years (the average being
ten years, which reflects the expected lifetime of a given PEF).68

Until a fund’s return reaches a hurdle rate of return (e.g., 8%), the GP is not entitled
to receive any profits from the fund, and all profits are allocated to LPs. However, once the
fund’s return reaches the hurdle rate, profits are allocated disproportionately between the GP
and LPs until the GP receives 20% of carried interest had they received the profits of the fund
from the first dollar. Once the GP’s carried interest is satisfied, the remaining profits going
forward are allocated between the GP and LPs according to their capital interests in the fund.
Fleischer, supra note 4, at 22.
61
The clawback provision requires the individual partners of the PEF to return
distributions to the extent of any subsequent losses in other investments of the fund, so that
the GP never obtains profits more than its designated portion (e.g., 20%) of profits. It makes
the GP share in the downside of the investment so that the GP’s retention of a carried interest
functions as “both a risk-sharing mechanism and as an incentive . . . .” Carried Interest (Part
II): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 3 (2007)[hereinafter Rosenblum]
(statement of Bruce Rosenblum, Chairman of the Bd. of the Private Equity Counsel)
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/073107testbr.pdf; Andrew W. Needham, A
Guide to Tax Planning for Private Equity Funds and Portfolio Investments, May 20, 2002 TAX
NOTES 1256, 1228 (2002).
62
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–8, 1–10.
63
See Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 3 (testifying that “[a PEF] usually maintains a very
substantial equity stake in the company and continues to take an active role in improving the
company’s performance”).
64
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–3, 1–6. It is a common practice, as seen in the
Sun Capital and Loan Star Fund cases, to appoint the GP’s employee to the board of the
portfolio company.
65
Rosenblum, supra note 61; Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 362 n.7.
66
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–4; Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 362.
67
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–12, 1–13.
68
HARRY CENDROWSKI ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND
OPERATIONS 7 (2d ed. 2012); Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 36.
60
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FIGURE 1. STRUCTURE OF A BASIC PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT69

The fundamental tax objective of PEF investments is to avoid entitylevel taxes by using a partnership or pass-through entity.70 This way, PEFs
are treated as passive investors, not engaging in active business,71 and the
income generated by selling the securities of portfolio companies are treated
as long-term capital gains.72 This income then flows through to partners, and
the character determined at the entity level is preserved to partners because
the partnership is a pass-through entity.73
Tax scholars acknowledge that there is a significant issue with how to
tax carried interest of GPs.74 While the management fee is treated as ordinary
income, there are disagreements over the character of carried interest.75
Although current U.S. tax law treats the carried interest as capital gains,
69
Gregg D. Polsky, The Untold Story of Sun Capital: Disguised Dividends, 143 TAX
NOTES 556, 558 (2014).
70
Needham, supra note 61, at 1219.
71
Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing en banc, Sun Capital Partners III LP v.
New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013) (No.
12-2312) [hereinafter Amicus Brief in Sun Capital case].
72
I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222.
73
I.R.C. § 702(b); Fleischer, supra note 4, at 15.
74
For articles addressing the issue, see, e.g., Batchelder, supra note 57; Chris
Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares:
What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071 (2008).
75
For articles suggesting treating carried interest as ordinary income, see, e.g., Fleischer,
supra note 4, at 10–11; Karen C. Burke, The Sound and Fury of Carried Interest Reform, 1
COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 6 (2010). For articles endorsing current law, see, e.g., David A. Weisbach,
The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008). For articles
suggesting a modified approach, see, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The
Carried Interest Controversy: Let’s Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAX L. REV. 121 (2008).
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recognizing it as “a payout of a distributable share of partnership income,”76
a number of proposals suggest reforming how carried interest is taxed by
treating it instead as ordinary income.77 In addition, a recent reform proposal
suggests that certain GP management fees and expense allocations should be
treated as disguised dividends, effectively taxing this income as
compensation.78 Part IV discusses these reforms in detail.79
C. The Globalization of PEFs and Their Regional Distribution
Notwithstanding the growing role of private equity in the international
financial intermediation, it has been observed that the private equity industry
has grown regionally, if not locally, “more or less in isolation, with
differences in national legal and regulatory regimes, differential access to
information and behavioral biases discouraging cross-border transactions.”80
Since the 1990s, however, a globalization process began, led by U.S. GPs.81
This subpart examines the representative jurisdictions of GPs and LPs
(which correspond to residence country or home country), and destination
market (which corresponds to source country or host country). This Subpart
will show that (1) developed countries, such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, are dominant source countries in PEF investment; (2) more
than 90% of the GPs are located either in the United States or the United
Kingdom; and (3), developed countries are also major regions for LPs.
First, the United States is the largest destination market receiving private
equity investment, absorbing 40.7% of private equity investment worldwide,
followed by the United Kingdom and non-U.K. Europe.82 The Asia-Pacific
region is the fourth largest destination market.83 Table 1 shows the ranks of
both GPs’ jurisdictions and their destination markets. The share of the
developing countries in the PEFs’ destination markets is not substantial
compared to that of developed countries.
Second, the United States is also ranked first in terms of GP jurisdiction,
followed by the United Kingdom.84 The U.S. GPs account for 53% of

76

Fleischer, supra note 4, at 14–15.
Id. at 47–59. For more discussion on the carried interest, see infra text accompanying
notes 181−200.
78
For more discussion on management fees, see infra text accompanying notes 201−06.
79
See infra Part IV.
80
CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 139 (citing William L. Megginson, Toward a Global
Model of Venture Capital?, 16.1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 89 (2004)).
81
CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 144.
82
Id. at 153–54.
83
Id.
84
Id.
77
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investment value worldwide, and the U.K. GPs account for 40%.85 Although
the U.S. GPs tend to invest in the domestic market rather than invest offshore,
they have been increasing offshore investment significantly.86 The U.S. GPs’
outward orientation was initially focused on the European market, and then
expanded into other regions, such as Asia, Latin America, and the Middle
East.87 The European market, being a mature market, has both attractive and
unattractive features for U.S. GPs. It is a very competitive market, but it also
has a substantial number of undervalued companies whose potential will
bloom out “through superior governance, operational improvements, and
financial leverage.”88 Just before the global financial crisis started in late
2007, more than one-third of all European deals in terms of overall value
involved U.S. buyout firms.89 More recently, U.S. firms have expanded into
other regimes. The Asia-Pacific region is the world’s third largest private
equity market, although its deal size is relatively small compared to that of
mature markets.90
European GPs have made considerable efforts to penetrate the U.S.
market as well as emerging markets, especially in the Asia-Pacific and
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) markets.91 However, on a net basis,
Europe has been an importer of private equity capital, while the United States
has been an exporter.92 The Asia-Pacific region is also a significant net
importer of private equity capital.93
Nonetheless, among European GPs, the United Kingdom should be
treated differently based on the empirical evidence. As shown in Table 1,
40% of the acquisitions made by all buyout PEFs in a study is made with
U.K.-based funds.94 53% is managed by U.S.-based funds.95 Conversely, the
United Kingdom absorbed only 22% of the overall amount of capital
deployed.96 Thus, the United States and the United Kingdom are two key

85

Id.
Id. at 152 (comparing, for example, U.S.-based funds raised in late 1990s and early
2000s and observing a significant increase in their investments in Europe).
87
CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 157.
88
Id. at 144.
89
The most active investor in Europe is KKR, ranked second in PEI 300 2014. Id. at
144; PEI 300 2014, supra note 30.
90
CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 145−46.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 149.
93
Id. at 154.
94
Id. at 153–54.
95
Id.
96
Id. Cornelius seems to imply that the United Kingdom is a net exporter of capital by
comparing 22% of global private equity capital invested in the United Kingdom. portfolio
company with 40% of private equity capital deployed worldwide being managed by U.K.86
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jurisdictions of GPs, accounting for 93% of the private equity capital
deployed worldwide.

TABLE 1. INVESTMENT VALUE BY ORIGIN OF GP AND DESTINATION
MARKET97

Investor
Country

United
States
United
Kingdom
NonU.K.
Europe
AsiaPacific
Total

United States

United
Kingdom
€
%
billion

Recipient Country
Non-U.K.
Asia-Pacific
Europe
€
€
%
%
billion
billion

Latin
America
€
%
billion

€
billion

%

37,398

72.7

4,098

8.0

5,865

11.4

2,520

4.9

1,542

3.0

2,194

5.7

17,266

44.6

19,101

49.3

168

0.4

-

-

26

0.4

2

0.0

5,882

99.5

-

-

-

-

83

5.6

-

-

-

-

1,385

92.7

27

1.8

39,704

40.7

21,365

21.9

30,848

31.6

4,074

4.2

1,568

1.6

Total
€
billion

%

100
(53)*
100
38,731
(40)
51,424

5,909

100
(6)

100
(1)
100
97,559
(100)
1,495

Looking at the relationship between destination countries and GPs’
countries, of the capital exported by U.S. buyout funds, the largest (11.4%)
was invested in non-U.K. Europe, followed by the U.K. (8.0%) and Asia
(4.9%).98 By contrast, the Latin American market did not play a significant
role for U.S.-based funds (3%).99 The U.K.-based funds invested heavily in
non-U.K. European markets (49.3%) out of the capital deployed.100 For both
U.S.-based and U.K.-based funds, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
market did not show a meaningful number in the study.
However, the data in Table 1 will need to be updated to fill in missing
based funds. However, it is not clear whether the United Kingdom could be characterized as a
net exporter of capital with this data, because 40% investment made by U.K.-based funds
presumably relates to capital raised from all over the world. Nonetheless, it can be argued that
the United Kingdom is “the most international market.” See id. at 154.
97
Id. at 153, Table 7.4. (data compiled from source table). In the table created by
Cornelius, I added the percentage ratio (*) of the total invest amount of each investor country
to the total invest amount of all countries in the parenthesis at the right first column. Cornelius
relied on AlpInvest Partners’ proprietary database for this table, in which the sample includes
102 buyout funds raised between 1995 and 2004. The AlpInvest Partners is a Dutch-based
PEF, ranked at forty-ninth in PEI 300 2014. See PEI 300 2014, supra note 30.
98
CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 153–54.
99
Id. at 154.
100
Id. at 153–54.
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data from the recent decade. As shown in Table 2 and Figure 2, the Latin
American market exceeds the net capital flows toward the non-U.K.
European or CEE markets since 2009. Among emerging markets, AsiaPacific and Latin American markets are the most important capital importing
regions.
TABLE 2. PEFS WITH REGIONAL FOCUS RAISED BY YEAR101

USD (BILLION)

2007

2008

2009

EMERGING ASIA

28.7

39.7

15.9

CEE AND CIS

14.6

5.6

1.6

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN

4.4

4.5

2.2

MENA

5.3

6.9

1.1

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

2.0

2.2

1.0

MULTI-REGION

4.1

7.7

0.8

EMERGING MARKET (NO. OF

59.2

66.5

22.6

FUNDS WITH CLOSES)

(204)

(210)

(196)

FIGURE 2. NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING ECONOMIES, BY REGION
102
AND INVESTMENT TYPE

101

TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 60, Exhibit 4.1. (data compiled from source
table). Talmor and Vasvari relied on many reports issued by Emerging Markets Private Equity
Association for this table. Id.
102
Peter Cornelius, Financial Deepening, Private Equity and Capital Flows to Emerging
Markets, 1 REV. PRIVATE EQUITY, 9, Fig. 11 (2011), http://alpinvest.com/
assets/pdfs/The_Review_of_Private_Equity_-_Volume_1_Issue_2.pdf. Cornelius relied on a
report issued by the Institute of International Finance in 2011 to create this chart. Id. Although
this data includes overall capital flows, including FDI and FPI, it can be a reference to show
the time when the size of Latin American economy exceeds that of CEE.
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FIGURE 3. EMERGING MARKET PRIVATE CAPITAL INFLOWS, NET ($
BILLION)103

Third, LPs’ jurisdictions are less known to the public. Although it is hard
to find data on LPs’ regional distributions in global PEF investment, Preqin’s
global database of data of LPs’ origin in the emerging market investment
could work as a sample of the LPs’ jurisdictions for the broader investment
region.104 As shown in Figure 4, the United States (38%) and Western Europe
(30%) are the top two regions of 3542 LPs listed in the database in 2011.105

103
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKETS 1,
Chart 1 (2014), http://iif.com/emr/capflows201405.php.
104
Talmor and Vasvari introduce Preqin database as follows: “Preqin, an independent
data provider, offers one of the most comprehensive and detailed sources of private equity
performance data covering both buyout and venture funds. Their statistics are based on data
from a number of different sources, including from GPs themselves. This dataset covers over
5,000 private equity funds of all types and a geographic focus that represents about 70% of all
private equity capital committed worldwide” as of 2009. See TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note
21, at 8–9. For more information, visit www.preqin.com.
105
Cornelius, supra note 102, at 10.
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FIGURE 4. EMERGING MARKET LPS, BY GEOGRAPHY106
Emerging
economies
487
(16%)

Other advanced
economies
487
(16%)

United States
1161
(38%)
Western Europe
907
(30%)

III. THE NATURE OF PEF INVESTMENT IN THE CROSS-BORDER CONTEXT
A. Insufficient Study for PEFs
The international finance and tax policy literature has divided crossborder transactions into two major categories: foreign direct investment
(FDI)107 and foreign portfolio investment (FPI).108 With regards to certain
challenges under the traditional international tax regime that we encounter

106
Id. at 10, Fig. 13. (data compiled from source table). Cornelius accessed the Preqin
database on July 15, 2011, and asserted that only a small portion of LPs in the PEF investing
in the emerging markets are headquartered in emerging markets, and a large portion of them
are foreign. However, I use the same statistics to show that the United States and Western
Europe are the top two regions for the origin of the LPs in the emerging markets.
107
FDI is defined as ownership of foreign investors of a controlling form, typically at
least 10% of voting stock in the local investing entity. There is plenty of traditional
international tax scholarship accumulated with regard to FDI, so that the examples of
multinational enterprises are easily caught by international tax policy radar screen, attracting
constant attention from public and academia. For more on FDI in general, see, e.g., Pol Antràs,
Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley, Multinational Firms, FDI Flows, and Imperfect Capital
Markets, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1171, 1171–219 (2009); Lars P. Feld & Jost H. Heckemeyer, FDI
and Taxation: A Meta-Study, 25 J. ECON. SURV. 233, 233–272 (2011); Roger H. Gordon &
James R. Hines Jr., International Taxation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 8854, 2002), http://www.nber.org/ papers/w8854.pdf?new_window=1.
108
For more on FPI, see, e.g., DORON HERMAN, TAXING PORTFOLIO INCOME IN GLOBAL
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2002); Avi-Yonah, supra note 23; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23;
Yaron Z. Reich, Taxing Foreign Investors’ Portfolio Investments: Developments &
Discontinuities, 98 TAX NOTE INT’L. 1975, 1976–1986 (1998) (focusing on inbound FPI).
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when dealing with cross-border investments,109 both FDI and FPI have been
the subject of extensive analysis. FDI is the most basic form of cross-border
investment; corporations or individuals who directly invest in a foreign
company with substantial ownership to influence the foreign company’s
business decision are engaged in FDI. The multinational enterprises (MNEs),
such as Google and Apple, which have their own affiliates all over the world,
are major players in FDI.110 Since MNEs’ tax strategies constantly garner
media coverage, plenty of resources in international tax are focused on this
issue either to attack or to defend the MNEs’ strategy.111
In addition, in the last decade, the public finance and tax law literature
have started studying FPI as distinguished from FDI.112 Using the term FPI
as the opposite concept of FDI, income arising from FPI or portfolio income
usually refers to the passive investment income, such as dividends, interest,
or capital gains.
By contrast, there has been relatively little study of foreign indirect
investments (FII),113 particularly the use of fund vehicles, notwithstanding
the fact that they are of increasing economic importance. Recognizing a lack
A commentator described the current international tax regime as a “flawed miracle.”
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1303–04 (arguing that it is a miracle because “a coherent
international tax regime exists” notwithstanding the fact that it is very hard to reach a
consensus among sovereign states, but still flawed especially in two areas: one is FPI and the
other is MNEs).
110
OECD, BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 14 (4th ed. 2008).
111
See generally Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International
Tax and Ownership Nationality 1–3 n.1–6 (U. Pa. L. Sch. Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 14-5, U. Pa.
Inst. L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 14-3, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2394227. In
regard to Apple’s tax strategy, see, e.g., OFFSHORE PROFIT SHIFTING AND THE U.S. TAX CODE—
PART 2 (APPLE INC.) BEFORE THE PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SEN. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., 152–91 (2013),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg81657/html/CHRG-113shrg81657.htm;
Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-atlow-tax-states-and-nations.html. In regard to Google’s tax strategy, see, e.g., Edward D.
Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 707–14 (2011), Jesse Drucker, Google
2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 21, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-srevenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html; Jesse Drucker, “Dutch Sandwich” Saves Google Billions
in
Taxes,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK,
Oct.
22,
2010,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39784907/ns/business-us_business/t/dutch-sandwich-savesgoogle-billions-taxes/.
112
See supra text accompanying note 1078.
113
In this article, “indirect investment” refers to an investment to pool capital for
investment from multiple investors and to invest in the underlying assets through vehicles,
such as funds, trusts, or other entities. It is commonly called a “fund investment” or “collective
investment” in a rough sense, although these terms are not always used identically or
consistently. See also infra Part III.C for more details.
109
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of international tax rules dealing with indirect investment in international tax,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)114
and the International Fiscal Association (IFA)115 have released several
reports dealing with the application of tax treaties to FII mechanisms.
However, the OECD and IFA reports limit the scope of their suggestions to
mutual funds or collective investment vehicles (CIVs),116 and explicitly
exclude “the issue of treaty entitlement with respect to investment through
private equity funds, hedge funds or trusts or other entities” from their
scope.117 Existing studies in the international tax field on fund investments
also deal mostly with investment by mutual funds or CIVs only, to the
exclusion of PEFs and similar vehicles.118 As a result, PEFs have been understudied, despite their significance, and the resulting gap in the literature has
made tax authorities and taxpayers suffer from the lack of proper rules and
policy for taxing cross-border investment by PEFs.
Traditionally, the PEF industry has argued that PEFs are passive
investors subject to the same rule as FPI. 119 This part of the article argues
For OECD’s discussion, see OECD, TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PORTFOLIO
INVESTMENT - MUTUAL FUNDS AND POSSIBLE TAX DISTORTIONS (1999); OECD, FIRST
MEETING OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE
INVESTMENT VEHICLES, LONDON, 9–10–11 (2007); OECD, REPORT OF THE INFORMAL
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES AND
PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS ON THE GRANTING OF TREATY
BENEFITS WITH RESPECT TO THE INCOME OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES (2009);
OECD, R(24). THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS WITH RESPECT TO THE INCOME OF
COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL
2010 1–34 (2012) [hereinafter CIV REPORT].
115
For IFA’s discussion, see INT’L FISCAL ASSOC., Volume LXXIIB THE TAXATION OF
INVESTMENT FUNDS : 51ST CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FISCAL ASSOCIATION, NEW
DELHI 1997 (1997).
116
Mutual funds are the equivalent concept of CIVs as the term is used in OECD
literature, or of regulated investment companies (RIC) under the Code. See I.R.C. § 851(f)(1).
These funds differ from private equity funds to the extent that the former are more open to the
public, and are regulated by the government, while the latter are private, and are often not
regulated by the government.
117
CIV REPORT, supra note 114, at R(24)–4.
118
See, e.g., TOMI VIITALA, TAXATION OF INVESTMENT FUNDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
13 (2005). Viitala defines the term “investment fund” in his study to refer to CIVs within the
scope of UCITS Directive of 1985: COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 85/611/EEC OF 20 DECEMBER 1985
ON THE COORDINATION OF LAWS, REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS RELATING TO
UNDERTAKINGS FOR COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT IN TRANSFERABLE SECURITIES. The UCITS
Directive covers “only publicly-offered open-end investment funds which invest in
transferable securities and money market instruments.” Id. at 2, n. 5.
119
See, e.g., Amicus Brief in Sun Capital case, Sun Capital, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013)
(No. 12-2312). Many PEFs have historically relied on certain tax authorities, including the
following two United States Supreme Court cases, to support the position that they are not
engaged in a “trade or business” for federal income tax purposes: The first case is Higgins v.
114
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that PEF investment should not be treated as purely passive because of the
hybrid nature of its investment activity. However, to what extent private
equity is active is a difficult question. Conceptualizing the nature of PEF
investment by comparing other types of cross-border investment would help
set a new benchmark for taxing PEF investment that should be aimed for in
international tax.
B. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investment
(FPI): Active and Passive Distinction in International Tax
Before outlining the distinct features of PEFs in more detail, it will be
useful to clarify some key terms used to characterize patterns of investment
in the modern global economy.
In a very general sense, the phrase “foreign direct investment” can be
defined as “an investment made by a company or entity based in one country
in a company or entity based in another country.”120 However, for public
finance and tax law, FDI means more than just acquiring an ownership
interest in a foreign company. The term “direct investment” usually refers to
a long-term relationship between direct investors and investees in which the
investors exercise a significant degree of influence and control over the
investee, 121 and in which the investors typically acquire at least 10% of the
investee entity.122 The Internal Revenue Code (Code) also assumes that the
foreign investment is classified as direct (and thus treated as an FDI) when
the investing entity owns at least 10% of the investee’s voting stock.123
Two terms should be distinguished from FDI. First, the term “foreign
indirect investment” refers to an investment mechanism that pools capital
from multiple investors in order to invest in underlying assets through
intermediary vehicles, such as CIVs or PEFs.124 It may acquire less than a
Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941) and the second case is Whipple v. Commissioner, 373
U.S. 193 (1963).
120
Investopedia,
FOREIGN
DIRECT
INVESTMENT
(FDI)
DEFINITION,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fdi.asp.
121
OECD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT OECD FACTBOOK 2013: ECONOMIC,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL STATISTICS (2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
sites/factbook-2013-en/04/02/01/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2013-34-en.
122
Gordon & Hines Jr., supra note 107, at 42; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 539
(acknowledging that the dividing line between direct and portfolio investment may be
controversial, because some countries use a lower threshold ⸺ 5% or even 1% ⸺ in
classifying investment as direct. However, it argues that some dividing line exists and 10% is
the commonly used throughout the OECD).
123
See, e.g., Act of Aug. 16, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83−591, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 286 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 902 (1954)), repealed by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.
115–97, § 14301(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2221.
124
A layperson might intuitively think that when the individual or corporation owns less
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10% ownership in the investee entity, but not necessarily so.
Second, the public finance and tax literature use the phrase “foreign
portfolio investment” as the complementary concept to FDI.125 Like FDI
investors, FPI investors invest in the securities of the investee company (such
as stocks and bonds), but they generally are not particularly interested in the
management of the investee company, and they typically do not own more
than 10% of the voting stock.126 FPI is often accomplished using a vehicle
such as a fund, but, again, no particular form is inherent to the definition of
FPI.
Further complication comes with the distinction between “active
business income” and “passive income” in international taxation. The present
consensus among international community allocates taxpayers’ active
business income to the source jurisdiction, and passive or portfolio income
to the residence jurisdiction.127 Many international tax scholars articulate the
boundary between active and passive income as follows: active business
income is derived from the economic activities of FDI, involving direct
control over the local entity, while passive income (or portfolio income) is
derived from activities which are not related to the exercise of direct control
by the taxpayer.128 Active business income also corresponds to the income
“effectively connected” with a U.S. “trade or business” under the Code,129
and to the income attributable to a “permanent establishment” under tax
treaties.130
In essence, the concept of FDI is inherently linked with the acquisition
and exercise of direct control over a target or investee entity, and it involves
the receipt of active business income for tax purposes. By contrast, the notion

than 10% of the voting stock in foreign entity, such an investment would be classified as FII.
However, it is not the definition of FII. See infra Part III.C.
125
Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 539 (stating that “[i]nvestment is classified as
portfolio when the individual or corporation owns less than 10% of the foreign entity”).
126
Investopedia, Foreign Portfolio Investment – FPI, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/f/foreign-portfolio-investment-fpi.asp. For the ownership threshold of portfolio
investment, see, e.g., Greatz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 539.
127
Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1306.
128
Id. at 1309–10 (recognizing that direct investors may earn passive income, such as a
direct dividend, from FDI, in which case such dividend is treated differently from the passive
portfolio dividend. Nonetheless, even such direct dividend is taxed primarily in the residence
country of the direct investors. Thus, he reserves the term portfolio income for passive income
which is not connected to the direct control). See also Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at
539–42 (often using passive investment and portfolio investment as synonym).
129
I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1318 (noting that the
terms “trade or business” and “effective connected” are not defined in the Code, but it has
been established that such terms refer to the active business operation by rulings and court
precedents).
130
Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1307.
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of FPI connotes a more passive investment model, without direct control over
the target entity, and it elicits passive or portfolio income for tax purposes.
However, the term FPI has also traditionally been used to cover cross-border
fund investment that I defined as FII, because FPI often uses intermediary
vehicles.131 Nonetheless, using an intermediary is not conceptually necessary
for FPI. Hence, this article will distinguish FII from FPI, and will use the
term FPI to refer to a category of pure portfolio investment without using an
intermediary, after showing how the term FPI has been analytically blurred
with analysis of CIV and PEF in the next Subpart.
C. Foreign Indirect Investment (FII): PEF and Collective Investment
Vehicle (CIV)
As noted above, FII can be defined as an investment mechanism that
pools capital from multiple investors through intermediary vehicles. FII may
be further divided into two subcategories. The first category is variously
described as mutual funds, regulated investment companies (RICs), or CIVs,
regardless of what term is used,132 which are “subject to investor-protection
regulation in the country in which they are established.”133 The second
category includes a wide range of alternative investment vehicles in the
international finance market with different investment objectives and
organizational structures, such as PEFs or hedge funds.134 Since hedge funds
are often included in the broad definition of PEFs, the second subcategory
will usually refer to PEFs in this article.135
131

Investopedia,
Foreign
Investment
Routes:
The
FDI
and
FPI,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/012914/foreign-investment-routes-fdi-andfpi.asp.
132
See supra text accompanying note 116.
133
CIV REPORT, supra note 114, at 3.
134
For a comparison between hedge funds and mutual funds, see, e.g., Alan L. Kennard,
The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX L. 133 (2003).
135
I include hedge funds in the broad concept of PEFs in light of the wide spectrum of
forms within the category of hedge funds. First, traditional hedge funds sought positive returns
whether the market rose or fell by holding both long and short positions in their investments.
The hedge funds sought profit by adjusting the ratio of long and short position according to
prevailing and predicted market conditions. This “hedging” behavior prompted the name of
the funds. Gain or loss of the hedge funds depended on inefficiencies in the market, not on
whether the market is good or bad. The investment strategy heavily focusing on arbitrage is
quite anomalous, and not a good business model to start thinking about the general tax reform.
(For the tax issues and analysis of hedge funds, see Andrew W. Needham & Christina Brause,
Hedge Funds, 736-2nd TAX MGMT. BNA U.S. INCOME PORTF., I.A. (2014).) However, today’s
hedge funds are not market neutral any more, and instead employ investment strategy similar
to that of private equity funds. In this regard, some literatures include hedge funds in the broad
definition of private equity funds. See CENDROWSKI ET AL., supra note 68, at 4; Sanchirico,
supra note 111, at 48.
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The notion that FII is somehow more related to passive FPI than to FDI
is in general only true for the first subcategory of FIIs (i.e., the CIVs). On the
contrary, the investment objectives of PEFs, the second subcategory of FII,
are not limited to passive investment but “cover the full spectrum of the
market.”136 Nonetheless, existing studies of PEFs seem to focus on portfolio
investment in general and do not distinguish PEFs in particular,137 resulting
in an unfortunate analytical blurring of the two terms.
As a matter of fact, PEFs typically seek to acquire control over — or at
least significant positions in — a target company, acquiring at least 10% of
the stock, because the PEF managers seek to influence the target company
and change the capital structure optimally in order to increase its value,
especially in the case of buyout funds.138 Hence, in terms of ownership ratio,
PEFs typically involve a higher degree of control over portfolio companies
than CIVs’ holdings in portfolio equities.139 In this respect, PEFs share a
common feature with FDI.
The extent to which PEF investment income should be treated as active
income is somewhat controversial. Traditionally, the private equity industry
has argued that PEFs are passive investors and partnership profits allocated
to both GPs and LPs are passive income, because “making and deriving
income from investments (in the form of income and capital gains), and
paying professional managers to manage those investments does not
constitute a ‘trade or business’ for purposes of the [Code].”140 However,
recent proposals on carried interest envision that at least GP’s carried interest
among partnership profits should be treated as ordinary income.141
Furthermore, the recent ruling in the Sun Capital case by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, holding that the Sun Capital fund was engaged
136

Andrew W. Needham, Private Equity Funds, 735-2nd TAX MGMT. BNA U.S. INCOME
PORTF., II.A.1. (2014).
137
See, e.g., CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 155. By addressing the home bias issue in the
fund investment both by mutual funds and by private equity, Cornelius criticizes the existing
Survey of International Monetary Fund and U.S. Treasury, contending that both surveys are
limited to FPI and does not include data of FDI. He further argues that this is an important
shortcoming for his study on the private equity because PEFs are typically holding more than
10% of the foreign company. Cornelius also criticizes the data capturing FDI in Philip R. Lane
& Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended
Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004, 73 J. INT’L. ECON. 223 (2007) and
Philip R. Lane & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, The Drivers of Financial Globalization, 98 AM.
ECON. REV. 327 (2008), arguing that such data does not provide information on private equity
either because it does not identify individual classes of foreign investors, such as private
equity. Id.
138
TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 4.
139
Id.
140
VIITALA, supra note 118, at 6.
141
See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 4, at 57.
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in a trade or business,142 broadens the tax agenda of activeness of PEF from
the GP’s carried interest to the overall income of both GPs and LPs arising
from the investment activity of PEFs.143 This issue will be further discussed
in Part IV.
Nevertheless, the traditional position — that not only CIVs but also PEFs
are merely passive investors in portfolio companies and are not engaged in a
“trade or business” — may explain the confusion that results from treating
both CIVs and PEFs as a genre of portfolio investment (or FPI in cross-border
transactions), notwithstanding the higher degree of control shown by many
PEFs.
However, since using an intermediary is not conceptually necessary for
FPI, this article will distinguish FII from FPI. A similar distinction will be
drawn between PEFs and CIVs: a PEF involves direct control while a CIV
does not.
D. Conceptualizing the Hybrid Nature of PEF Investment
The foregoing suggests that it is possible to distinguish FDI, FPI, PEFs,
and CIVs along two conceptual axes: direct control vs. noncontrol, and
traditional direct investment without intermediaries vs. indirect investment
with intermediaries. A 2x2 matrix in Table 3 below shows how FDI, FPI,
PEFs and CIVs are placed in each of the four squares.

142

Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013). See infra Part IV.B.2 for more discussion on the Sun
Capital case.
143
Although the Sun Capital case involved the definition of the term trade or business
for ERISA purposes only, “it is not a big leap to argue that the fund was engaged in a trade or
business for tax purposes.” See Victor Fleischer, Sun Capital Court Ruling Threatens
Structure of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/08/01/sun-capital-court-ruling-threatens-private-equity-structure/. Many practitioners
are criticizing the Sun Capital case with the concern that it might change the tax treatment of
PEFs adversely affecting the private equity industry. See Davis Polk, First Circuit Sun Capital
Decision Increases ERISA Exposure for
Private Equity Funds (Aug. 6, 2013),
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/ 08.06.13.Sun_.Capital.pdf; see also Deloitte,
FIRST CIRCUIT HOLDS PRIVATE EQUITY FUND POTENTIALLY LIABLE FOR PORTFOLIO COMPANY
PENSION OBLIGATIONS DUE TO TRADE OR BUSINESS ACTIVITY (2013); Christian M. McBurney,
Private equity funds need not fear tax consequences of Sun Capital, but should they be
concerned about where the IRS might take it? (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/166177_Private_Equity_Alert_ 18NOV2013.pdf; PwC,
TAX ALERT: SUN CAPITAL PARTNERS COURT CASE RULING PWC, http://www.pwc.com/
us/en/alternative-investment/publications/sun-capital-partners-pension-fund-ruling.jhtml.
However, there are comments from public sector for supporting the Sun Capital case. See
Steven M. Rosenthal, Private Equity Is a Business: Sun Capital and Beyond, 140 TAX NOTES
1459 (2013); Rosenthal, supra note 7.
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TABLE 3. CLASSIFICATION OF CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENTS
DIRECT CONTROL

NONCONTROL

DIRECT INVESTMENT
FDI
FPI
(WITHOUT INTERMEDIARY)
INDIRECT INVESTMENT
PEF
CIV
(WITH INTERMEDIARY)
Such a classification certainly simplifies the features of each type of
investment, because they often overlap with each other to some extent. To be
specific, although this article distinguishes FII from FPI, FPI has been
generally used to cover FII, including through both PEFs and CIVs. In
addition, PEFs have features of both FDI and CIVs.144 The ownership ratio
of a PEF in the portfolio company is mostly more than 10%, as with FDI.145
Nor is it clear whether a PEF’s investment should be treated as active or
passive. On the other hand, PEFs, like CIVs, have typically treated
themselves as passive investors for tax purposes and not as if they were
engaged in a “trade or business,” relying in part on two U.S. Supreme Court
cases.146 In addition, the investment structure used by a PEF resembles that
used by a CIV, although PEFs tend to have more flexible and complicated
investment structures than FDI or CIVs, often involving multiple layers of
pass-through entity and corporate-type special purpose vehicles spread across
multiple jurisdictions.147
However, this overlapping does not justify treating PEFs in the same
way as other types of investment. PEFs are distinguished from FDI by their
use of an intermediary vehicle. In addition, a PEF’s investment spectrum is
typically different from that of a CIV, or FPI. Moreover, PEFs, which are
essentially privately held partnerships, are less transparent to the public than

144

Kimberly Evans, Foreign Portfolio and Direct Investment: Complementarity,
Differences, and Integration, OECD GLOB. FORUM INT’L. INV. (2002),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentfordevelopment/2764407.pdf. Although Evans did not
distinguish PEF as an independent category from FPI and FDI, she illustrated PEF as an
overlapping area where the FDI and FPI merge, by arguing as follows: “There is no identifiable
dividing line between portfolio and direct investment, but only an area of overlap where the
two merge. For instance, a portfolio investor may be active in the equities market, but equity
holdings are also one of the main means of direct investment.”
145
A recent research study comparing private equity and conglomerates, which represent
direct investment, also concluded that although private equity firms differ significantly from
conglomerates, those two share a lot in common. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 8,
39.
146
Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963); Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S.
212 (1941); see also Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1462.
147
See infra Figure 6. Structure of the Loan Star Fund case. For a basic domestic PEF
structure, see supra Figure 1. Structure of a Basic Private Equity Investment.
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FDI, FPI, and/or CIVs,148 and the information is less available even to the
domestic regulatory agencies because reporting requirements have been
limited.149 However, if the administrative authorities tried to obtain
information on the individual investors behind the vehicle, it would be easier
to do so for PEFs than in CIVs, because PEFs tend to have only a handful of
high profile investors,150 which rarely change during the lifetime of a fund,151
while CIVs generally have many more, including private retail investors.
Therefore, the tax implications of FDI, FPI, CIVs, and PEFs should be
as different as their economics and business strategies are, and, in particular,
the international tax rules and policy for each type of investment should
reflect differences between these mechanisms. In the last decade, public
finance and tax law literature have started to distinguish FPI and CIVs from
FDI for the purpose of policy analysis.152 However, little independent
analysis of PEFs has been conducted,153 which is astonishing given the
148
Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 5 (arguing that the rise of private equity has
been controversial in many ways, citing some critics point about counterproductive lack of
transparency of the private equity as private partnerships). For media criticizing the private
feature of the big deals done by private equity, see Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 5
n.21 (citing Eli Noam, Private Equity Is a Problem for Public Media, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2007,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/50ca3cb0-c01e-11db-995a000b5df10621.html#axzz32yhzc5K2; Eli Noam, Invading the privacy of private equity, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2866ab32-c3ac-11db-9047000b5df10621.html#axzz32yhzc5K2).
The lack of transparency in the private equity industry is not limited to international tax issues.
See TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21 (arguing that because of the private nature of
the market, “it is extremely challenging for the outsider to understand and form a view on the
workings of the industry”).
149
Sanchirico, supra note 111, at 48. However, the Dodd-Frank Act now imposes
disclosure requirement on the managers of hedge funds, private equity funds, or venture capital
funds. See The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 404, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 17.
150
One can easily imagine thousands of investors in a mutual fund. However, private
equity firms have made a practice of only seeking investment capital from high profile
investors, such as pension funds, charitable endowments, and high net-wealth individuals.
Such practice inhibits access to the private equity from the ordinary private investors. See
Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 5–6.
151
Interest in PEFs is “an intrinsically illiquid asset class” so that partners in PEFs rarely
change during the lifetime of PEFs. Although the recent development of the secondary market
for trading interests in PEFs to provide liquidity will give greater complexity, it is still true
that the change in partners is relatively less common in PEFs than in CIVs. See TALMOR &
VASVARI, supra note 21, at 187.
152
For FPI, see supra note 108. For FDI, see supra note 107. For CIVs, see supra notes
1163, 116.
153
Graetz, supra note 28, at 327 n.254. Extensive studies have been conducted with
respect to PEFs under the U.S. domestic tax law since 2000, especially concentrating on taxing
carried interest as either ordinary income or capital gains. See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, The
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growth of private equity over the last 20 years.154
E. A New Benchmark for PEF Investment
Given the hybrid nature of PEF investment, the norms of existing
international tax policy with respect to FDI and/or FPI cannot simply be
applied to PEFs. The literature on international tax policy with respect to FDI
is dominated by global welfare benchmark models to advance worldwide
economic efficiency, or neutrality, such as Capital Export Neutrality (CEN),
Capital Import Neutrality (CIN), National Neutrality (NN), Capital
Ownership Neutrality (CON), and National Ownership Neutrality (NON).155
The literature on FPI also discusses whether the above global welfare
theory could apply to FDI. For example, Michael Graetz and Itai Grinberg
argue that neither CEN nor CIN is relevant to the taxation of FPI, whereas
they recommend NN for FPI to enhance American national well-being over
the global welfare.156 None have discussed recognizing PEFs’ hybrid nature
of FDI and FPI.
More fundamental criticism on the global welfare theory is that the
international tax neutralities that are standard criteria to evaluate normative
superiority of international tax policy in the global welfare theory are “not
appropriate tools for designing tax policy.”157 Each neutrality represents one
margin of distortion among many, and it is theoretically impossible to satisfy
the various neutralities at the same time.158 However, the debate concerning
U.S. international tax policy too often relies on the “single-bullet approach”
among “alphabet soup.”159 Furthermore, the various neutralities are not

Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit
Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 115 (2008); Adam Lawton, Taxing
Private Equity Carried Interest Using an Incentive Stock Option Analogy, 121 HARV. L. REV.
846 (2008); Fleischer, supra note 4; Weisbach, supra note 75. However, few studies are found
in relation to the international tax. Cf. Kimberly S. Blanchard, Cross-border Tax Problems of
Investment Funds, 60 TAX LAW. 583 (2007) (including analysis on the private equity
investment in addition to the mutual funds’ investment).
154
TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 3 (calling private equity a “new industry” and
providing that “private equity is responsible for up to a quarter of the global M&A activity
and as much as half of the leveraged loan issues in the capital markets”).
155
See generally Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax
Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003); Graetz, supra note 28, at 270–77; Daniel Shaviro, The
David R. Tillinghast Lecture - The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX
L. REV. 377, 386–87 (2010).
156
Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 556–75.
157
David A. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy, 68 NATL.
TAX J. 635 (2015).
158
Id. at 640.
159
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 14 (2014); Shaviro,
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directly related to the normative reasons for taxing relevant income.160
Thus, leaving aside the global welfare theory that does not lead to a
meaningful benchmark to PEF, this article draws attention to a fundamental
consensus in international taxation with regard to the active and passive
distinction, which provides more convincing standard for taxing income
earned from cross-border transactions. When allocating international tax
jurisdiction, active business income goes to the source country (where the
income is produced), and passive or portfolio income goes to the residence
country (where the income is consumed).161 Such consensus has been
reached since the development of the modern international tax regime led by
the League of Nations in 1920s,162 and the League’s 1928 model treaties
which codified this norm became the basis for more than 2000 bilateral
treaties throughout the world in addition to the model income tax treaties of
the OECD, the United Nations, and the United States.163
Tax scholars have been considering whether such consensus is justified.
Commentators who argue for a pure residence-based taxation for FPI seem
to agree with this consensus.164 However, there are commentators who
disagree with the consensus and argue for shifting the source-based tax
system on active corporate income to the pure residence-based tax system
(based on the residence of individual shareholders).165 By applying the global
welfare theory to evaluate the policy of allocating of tax jurisdiction, some
proponents of CEN also argue that residence-based taxation is normatively
superior to source-based taxation.166 While the argument for the pure
residence-based tax system would be reasonable for the very limited case of
a passive individual investor,167 it has problems when it comes to FDI or an
active investment by MNEs. First, it is difficult to determine the residence of
the business entity that is easily manipulated, or to impute the income to its
investors because of their complex investment structure.168 Second, the pure

supra note 155, at 386.
160
Weisbach, supra note 157, at 648.
161
Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1306.
162
Id. at 1305–06; Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 23, at 1066–89.
163
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 23, at 1023.
164
Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1331–33; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 568–74.
Although Graetz and Grinberg argue that national neutrality policy might be proper for FPI,
they still borrow that policy to support the residence country’s primary taxing right over the
FPI.
165
See, e.g., Robert A. Green, Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of
Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18 (1993).
166
See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 23, at 1102.
167
Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1311–13.
168
Id. at 1313; Shaviro, supra note 155. Although Avi-Yonah and Shaviro discuss the
electivity of residence by multinational corporations, the same is true for PEFs. PEFs use
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residence-based tax system will increase revenue for developed countries and
reduce revenue for developing countries, since the long-standing tax position
of the former is the country of residence whereas that of the latter is the
country of source.169 However, the source country will never forgo its taxing
right on business income produced on its soil.170 Therefore, the current
consensus on the distinction between active and passive and allocation of tax
jurisdiction accordingly serves as a reasonable and practical norm in
international tax.
The above discussion on the normative superiority of allocating tax
jurisdiction between source and residence countries suggests a useful
benchmark for taxing PEFs. The traditional position that PEF is a subcategory of FPI and subject to residence-based taxation is not justified,
because it does not accurately reflect the investment nature of PEF, and thus
does not accord with the fundamental consensus in the international tax
regime. It also harms the tax neutrality between direct and indirect investment
in the PEF investment context by improperly allocating tax jurisdiction.
Given that PEF overlaps with FDI in terms of activeness in business and that
portfolio companies are often located in developing countries, it would be
difficult for source countries to yield the entire tax jurisdiction over the
income arising from PEFs.171 Thus, the new baseline should be that PEF’s
income arising from the features of FDI or active business activity should be
subject to the source country’s tax jurisdiction, and income arising from the
features of FPI or passive investment should be subject to the residence
country’s tax jurisdiction.
Therefore, rather than adding another margin for worldwide efficiency
in the already complicated “alphabet soup,”172 this article proposes an
incremental reform of PEFs by applying the current consensus in
international tax more precisely according to PEF’s true nature. The new
benchmark would contribute to recovering tax neutrality between direct and
indirect investment by properly allocating tax jurisdiction. It would also be a
useful tool to evaluate various tax policy alternatives to reforming the

holding companies, which are corporations, so that the discussion can be applied as it is. In
addition, the issue of residence of partnership in international tax is even more complicated
than that of corporations. For further discussion, see OECD, R(15). The Application of the
OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND
ON
CAPITAL
2010,
at
1–98
(2012),
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
content/chapter/9789264175181-108-en.
169
Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1313–14.
170
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 23, at 1103.
171
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1313 (acknowledging that pure residence-based
taxation allows more revenue to developed countries and less revenue to developing
countries).
172
SHAVIRO, supra note 159, at 14.
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taxation of PEF and its partners. Keeping the new benchmark in mind, the
next part will review recent proposals on carried interest and management
fees, and relevant cases contributing to the discussion. Their international tax
implications will be discussed in Part V.
IV. CARRIED INTEREST AND BEYOND: ALTERNATIVES TO THE TAXATION
OF PEFS
Since the sensational article Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership
Profits in Private Equity Funds by Victor Fleischer, which publicized the
carried interest issue, was first circulated among tax policy groups in 2007,173
scholars and policy makers have discussed tax loopholes in PEF investment
and suggested reforms. However, not every proposed reform is based on the
understanding that PEFs are carrying out active investment or discusses its
international implications.
The most popular suggested tax reform for PEFs concerns the tax
treatment of GPs’ carried interest.174 The agenda has been expanded to GPs’
management fees since media coverage describing how little private equity
firms and their managers pay tax incited discussions during Mitt Romney’s
presidential campaign in 2011.175 However, those reform proposals are
limited to GPs’ income. Are LPs not guilty of playing the tax games that GPs
are playing? They might be, if LPs are taxable. However, most LPs are taxexempt, which is the key factor that makes the private equity tax game
possible.176 Meanwhile, recent cases in the United States and other countries
open the door for reframing the hybrid nature of PEF investment more
broadly.177 This Part discusses the proposals and cases as alternatives to the
taxation of PEF, and envisions the extent to which PEF income should be
treated as active and passive.
A. Proposals on Carried Interest and Management Fees
A GP’s income consists of three parts. First is the return of its capital
contribution (as capital interest), typically 1% to 5% of the fund’s entire
capital.178 Given that a PEF is established as a limited partnership, and that
it invests in the securities of portfolio companies and then sells them when it
exits, the fund’s income would be treated as long-term capital gains.179 Such
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Fleischer, supra note 4, at 59.
Burke, supra note 75, at 1−2.
Polsky, supra note 11, at 10.
Fleischer, supra note 4, at 13.
See infra Parts IV.B.2., V.C.2.
Supra note 57.
I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222. From time to time, the funds also earn other types of passive
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income flows through to partners, including the GP, and the character
determined at the entity level is transferred to partners as the partnership is a
pass-through entity.180
Second is carried interest. Carried interest is in substance a “contingent
fee for services,” but it is structured as a special allocation of the partnership’s
profit to the GP.181 Section 707 of the Code provides that a transaction
between a partner and a partnership by which the partner receives interest in
profits in return for her services to the partnership would be treated as a bona
fide partnership transaction, as long as (i) the partner receives it in her
capacity as a partner and (ii) the payment is not guaranteed (i.e.,
entrepreneurial risk exists).182 Since the GP can receive carried interest once
the partnership profits reach the hurdle rate of return, current tax law respects
the carried interest as “a payout of a distributable share of partnership
income” under section 707.183 Therefore, carried interest is taxed as capital
gains at a top rate of 20% under current law, which is preferential to ordinary
income with a top rate of 37%.184
A number of proposals have suggested reforming the tax treatment of
carried interest.185 Congressman Sander Levin of Michigan introduced a bill
to treat carried interest as ordinary income in 2007, but he ultimately dropped
it.186 Former President Obama also included a proposal for taxing carried
interest as ordinary income during his presidential campaign in 2008,187 and
again included the proposed change in his budget proposal for fiscal years
2010 through 2014.188 However, neither of the Obama Administration’s

income, such as dividends and interest, from portfolio companies. For simplicity, this article
discusses capital gains only as the funds’ income.
180
I.R.C. § 702(b); Fleischer, supra note 4, at 15.
181
Polsky, supra note 11, at 1.
182
I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A).
183
Fleischer, supra note 4, at 14–15.
184
Batchelder, supra note 57.
185
Fleischer, supra note 4, at 47–59.
186
H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007).
187
See LEONARD E. BURMAN ET AL., AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES’ TAX PLANS 1, 12, 23 (2008), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411741.
188
Hazel Bradford, Obama 2014 Budget Calls for Carried Interest Rate Elimination,
Retirement Savings Cap, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20130410/ONLINE/130419982/obama-2014-budget-callsfor-carried-interest-rate-elimination-retirement-savings-cap; Department of the Treasury,
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals 134-35
(2013),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/GeneralExplanations-FY2013.pdf; Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the
Administration’s
Fiscal
Year
2012
Revenue
Proposals
61-62
(2012),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2012.pdf; Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal
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attempts succeeded.189
The tide turned in 2015. The proposal to tax carried interest as ordinary
income had bipartisan support. Former President Obama again included the
proposal in his 2015 budget,190 and Congressman Dave Camp, Republican
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, also proposed
reforming the tax treatment of carried interest.191 Tax plans by thenpresidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump all endorsed such
a change during the 2016 election,192 and President Trump continued his plan
to cut the carried interest tax break.193 Economists estimated that the reform
will increase billions of tax revenue over ten years, but the estimates varied
from more than $3 billion over the next ten years194 to $17.4 billion over a
decade195 and $180 billion over ten years.196
Nevertheless, the final tax reform bill, also known as the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017, did not successfully close the loophole.197 It introduces a
Year 2011 Revenue Proposals 91-92 (2011), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2011.pdf; Department of the Treasury, General
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue Proposals 23-24 (2010),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2010.pdf.
189 See Louis Jacobson & Molly Moorhead, Tax Carried Interest as Ordinary Income,
POLITIFACT,
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/42/taxcarried-interest-as-ordinary-income/.
190 Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, Time to Close Private Equity’s “Carried
Interest” Loophole, THE HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Apr. 2, 2014), http://cepr.net/publications/
op-eds-columns/time-to-close-private-equitys-carried-interest-loophole.
191 Richard Rubin, Camp Hits Carried Interest in Tax Plan Focused on Finance,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS. Feb. 25, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0226/camp-hits-carried-interest-in-tax-plan-focused-on-finance.
192 Sean Neary, The Candidates Take on Taxes and Carried Interest, THE HILL, Sept. 11,
2015, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/presidential-campaign/253323-the-candidatestake-on-taxes-and-carried-interest.
193 Sahil Kapur, Here’s How Trump Could Try to Kill Carried-Interest Tax Break,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 17, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-0117/here-s-how-trump-could-try-to-kill-carried-interest-tax-break; Shabad, supra note 9.
194 Appelbaum & Batt, supra note 190.
195 CONG. BUDGET OFF., OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2014 TO 2023 128 (2013).
196 Victor Fleischer, How a Carried Interest Tax Could Raise $180 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/business/dealbook/how-a-carriedinterest-tax-could-raise-180-billion.html.
197 Although then-candidate Trump’s challenge to the carried interest loophole was
similar to the previous reform proposals that recharacterize carried interest as ordinary income,
the House Ways and Means Chairman Kevin Brady (R-Texas) introduced first a two-year
holding period and then a three-year holding period in the House Tax Bill, which is backed by
the former White House political strategist Steve Bannon. John Voskuhl & Melissa Mittelman,
Carried Interest Tax Break May Be Changed, House Tax Chief Says, BLOOMBERG BNA:
DAILY TAX REALTIME, Nov. 6, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2017-11-

454

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 37:421

new three-year holding period in order for investment managers to enjoy the
low capital gains tax rate.198 However, given the fact that the average lifetime
of a PEF is about ten years, and in many cases PEFs hold investments longer
than three years,199 many practitioners and commentators expect that the
reform bill may not effectively close the loophole.200
Third is the management fee, which is the compensation for the
managers’ service to the fund. Current tax law taxes management fees as
compensation for services (i.e., ordinary income).201 Gregg Polsky’s recent
study addressed the tax planning technique using management fees, expense
deduction, and monitoring fee offset. Many private equity firms, which
become a GP or a GP’s affiliates, waive the 2% management fee during the
formation of the fund in exchange for receiving additional partnership profits
interest without bearing any entrepreneurial risk, resulting in the conversion
of ordinary income tax treatment of management fees to capital gains.202
Allocating all expenses of funds to management fees and pushing down the
fund’s obligation to pay management fees to portfolio companies by fee
offset arrangements could also reduce GPs’ income from management fee
payment.203 In turn, GPs are compensated by receiving more partnership

06/carried-interest-tax-break-may-be-changed-house-tax-chief-says; Kevin Cirilli, Bannon
Backs Limit to Carried Interest in House Tax Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY TAX REALTIME,
Nov. 9, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-09/bannon-backs-limit-tocarried-interest-break-in-house-tax-bill. In the Senate, Senator Susan Collins (R-ME)
evaluated the carried interest provision in the House Tax Bill as modest and again proposed to
close the carried interest loophole in a more rigorous way, stating that President Trump agreed
with her in doing so in order to cover increased amount of child and adult-dependent credit.
Erik Wasson & Terrence Dopp, Sen. Collins: End Carried Interest Break to Cover Child
Credit, BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY TAX REALTIME, Nov. 30, 2017. However, the Senate Tax
Bill and the Final Tax Bill signed by President Trump only introduced the new three-year
holding period with respect to carried interest’ eligibility for the long-term capital gains tax
rate.
198 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13309, 131 Stat 2054, 2130
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1061).
199 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
200 See, e.g., Tae Kim, Gary Cohn: We ‘Tried 25 Times’ To Cut Hedge Fund Loophole
in Tax Reform Bill, But Failed, CNBC, Dec. 20, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/
2017/12/20/cohn-tried-25-times-to-cut-hedge-fund-loophole-but-failed.html;
Factor
&
Fedida, supra note 10; Brian Schwartz, Private Equity Firms Lobbied Tax Reform Bill as
Carried Interest Survives, FOX BUSINESS, Jan. 31, 2018, http://www.foxbusiness.com
/politics/2018/01/31/private-equity-firms-lobbied-tax-reform-bill-as-carried-interestsurvives.html (reporting that at least six private equity groups, including The Carlyle Group,
lobbied to maintain the carried interest tax break).
201 Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAX NOTES 743,
746 (2008).
202 Polsky, supra note 11, at 5–10.
203 GPs or their affiliated management firms provide management and consulting services to
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profits, which are taxed at a preferential rate.204
Governments began to recognize the need to challenge PEFs’ fees and
expenses. On July 22, 2015, the U.S. Treasury Department and the IRS
released a proposed regulation under section 707 of the Code, providing that
if a management fee waiver arrangement lacks “significant entrepreneurial
risk,” the carried interest received in return for waiving this fee would be
treated as a disguised payment for services, and taxed as ordinary income.205
Furthermore, the treasurer of California recently called for legislation to
make PEFs disclose their fees to investors for full transparency.206
However, since the conversion of management fees from ordinary
income into capital gains is available only when carried interest is taxed as
capital gains, the reforms taxing carried interest as ordinary income could
prevent exploiting the management fee waiver more fundamentally.
Therefore, this article includes the reform proposal on management fees as
part of a broader alternative of taxing carried interest as ordinary income.
B. Beyond the Carried Interest: PEF as a Trade or Business
The reforms discussed in Subpart A only deal with GPs’ activity and
income. However, a more ambitious position which has impact on both GPs’
and LPs’ activity and income has emerged: treating the entire activity of PEF
as a “trade or business” (ToB).
Treating PEFs as ToB is in line with recognizing the hybrid nature of
PEF investment based on the terms of international finance and tax discussed
in Part III, which notes that despite the passivity in form of using funds as
with portfolio investment, PEFs in substance acquire more than 10%
ownership in the portfolio company and then actively manage and monitor
the operation of the portfolio company. “Trade or business” is a more
technical term of art used in tax law. It is used many times throughout the
Code, but neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations thereunder have
portfolio companies directly, and the management firms charge “monitoring fees” for these
services to portfolio companies directly. GPs further receive “management fees” from the fund
for the same service. Hence, in order to avoid double-compensation of GPs for the same
service, most PEFs provide management fee offset arrangements which reduce GPs’
management fee to the extent that their affiliated management firms receive a fee from the
portfolio company for management services. Mark E. Berkowitz & Jessica Duran, Private
Equity Funds and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 149 Tax Notes 669, 673 (2015). This
results in not only reducing GPs’ income from management fee payment but also reducing
portfolio companies’ profits. For more discussion, see infra Part V.A.1.
204 Polsky, supra note 11, at 10–17.
205 Disguised Payments for Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,652 (proposed July 22, 2015).
206 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Challenging Private Equity Fees Tucked in
Footnotes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/business/
challenging-private-equity-fees-tucked-in-footnotes.html.
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defined the term.207 However, it is commonly used to describe a taxpayer’s
activities to produce income or profits from actively engaging in business, as
distinguished from a passive endeavor such as holding income-producing
property.208 The most recent Supreme Court case discussing the ToB is the
Greotzinger case, where the court held that “to be engaged in a trade or
business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and
regularity and . . . the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity
must be for income or profits.”209
One of the leading proponents of this position is Steven Rosenthal.
Rosenthal argues that PEFs are engaged in a ToB for tax purposes, because
PEFs’ activities of buying, developing, and finally reselling portfolio
companies are for profits, and these activities are continuous, regular, and
substantial.210 Rosenthal further asserts that any gains and losses of PEFs
conducting ToB should be treated as ordinary, not as capital, because assets
held by PEFs are excluded from the definition of capital assets.211
1.

Capital Gains vs. Ordinary Income

Can a PEF’s asset be excluded from capital assets? The Code excludes
from capital assets (1) inventory and (2) property held by the taxpayer for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.212
Rosenthal’s point is on the latter — a PEF’s assets are for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of ToB.213 If a PEF is to be treated as ToB, the main
question is whether the PEF’s assets are for sale “to customers.”
Many commentators think that the second category of exception to
capital assets is analogous to the first category (i.e., inventory held by
merchants or stock dealers), so that investors’ holding assets neither
constitutes ToB nor sale to customers.214 Thus, investors treat their stock as
207

Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1463; F. Ladson Boyle, What Is a Trade or Business?,
39 TAX LAW. 737 (1986).
208 CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS:
MATERIALS, TEXT, AND PROBLEMS 142 (4th ed. 2011).
209 Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
210 Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1465.
211 Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 364.
212 I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1).
213 Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 363.
214 There are three classes of taxpayers holding stocks: dealers, traders, and investors.
Dealers are holding stock as inventory to realize profits not for the appreciation of the stock
price, but for the mark-up in excess of the stock price. Traders are engaging in a large number
of stock transactions, realizing profits from the appreciation of the stock price. Both dealers
and traders are engaged in ToB, but only dealers have customers. Therefore, dealers treat the
stock as inventory, while traders treat the stock as capital assets. Investors are similar to
traders, making profits from the appreciation of the stock price when they sell it. However,
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capital assets.
On the other hand, Rosenthal argues that the second exception is added
to deny arbitrary deduction by Wall Street bankers, and that the term “to
customers” is meant to describe the middleman’s business, not to identify a
vendee.215 Furthermore, capital assets “must be narrowly applied and its
exclusions interpreted broadly,” because the preferential rate of capital gains
is an exception to the usual tax rate.216 He concludes that because PEFs make
their money from the everyday operation of a business, its income should be
treated as ordinary.217
However, it is not clear to what extent Rosenthal would treat a PEF’s
income as ordinary. In his first article discussing this issue, he seems to target
only the income of private equity firms (i.e., GPs).218 He refrains from
applying his theory to tax-exempt LPs and foreign LPs.219 However, in his
subsequent article on the Sun Capital case,220 which held that a PEF is
engaged in ToB under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), he seems to expand his position, arguing that a PEF’s ToB
influences an LP’s income portion as well.221
Whether a PEF’s assets can be excluded from capital assets is still
controversial. Although Rosenthal argues that a PEF can satisfy the
requirement of “to customers,” it is not likely accepted by leading tax
authorities yet. Nonetheless, excluding a PEF’s assets from capital assets and
treating the entire PEF’s income as ordinary is certainly a policy alternative
to consider in the spectrum of various alternatives. It could be supported
further if one would emphasize the active investment nature of PEF and argue
for a fundamental reform of PEF taxation.
Rosenthal’s argument that PEFs engage in ToB has drawn attention in
investors purchase stocks without regard to the fluctuation of the daily market price, and their
managerial attention to the stock is never considered as ToB, no matter how extensive such
activities might be. Thus, investors treat the stock as capital assets. See United States v. Wood,
943 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1991); Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941); see also
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 564 (6th ed. 2009).
215 Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 363–364. In the case of dealers discussing the requirement
of “to customers,” the Service is likely to support this argument, providing that “a
middleman’s vendees are customers per se whenever the middleman is seeking to earn a profit
by reselling to such vendees.” I.R.S., supra note 17.
216 Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 367; GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 214, at 558; Corn
Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).
217 Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 366.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 366 n.50.
220 Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013).
221 Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1469.
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the tax policy group, influencing the conclusion of the Sun Capital case by
the First Circuit.222 Besides the capital assets discussion, PEFs as ToB itself
has an impact on the tax consequences of LPs. Before discussing how to tax
LPs of PEFs further, let us examine the Sun Capital case.
2.

The Sun Capital Case

In 2006, Sun Capital Advisors Inc. (SCAI), a private equity house,
decided to invest in Scott Brass Inc. (SBI), and acquired the SBI through
three Sun Capital Funds.223 The Sun GP could receive the well-known “two
and twenty.” The Sun GP also owned a Management Company (Sun
Management Co.) that entered into a Service Agreement with SBI to
provided management services to SBI in exchange for consulting fees. When
the Sun Management Co. collected consulting fee from the SBI, the 2%
management fees payable by the Sun Funds to its GP were offset by these
consulting payments made by SBI (the “fee offset”).
FIGURE 5. STRUCTURE OF THE SUN CAPITAL FUND CASE224

The management services were actually provided by the employees of
SCAI pursuant to an agreement between the Sun Management Co. and SCAI.
Two to three directors of SBI who were appointed after the Sun Funds
acquisition were SCAI employees. Other SCAI personnel helped SBI’s
operation, such as by sending weekly reports to SCAI regarding “[SBI]’s
revenue streams, key financial data, market activity, sales opportunities,

222 See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 146 (quoting Rosenthal, supra note 7); Rosenthal, supra
note 143, at 1462.
223 Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 149−50 (the Sun Capital Fund IV and two parallel funds of
the Sun Capital Fund III divided SBI ownership 70% and 30%, respectively).
224 Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1460.
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meeting notes, and action items.”225 These SCAI personnel were copied in
SBI’s email regarding “liquidity, possible mergers, dividend payouts, and
revenue growth.”226
In 2008, however, SBI went into bankruptcy and stopped making
contributions to its pension plan, the New England Teamsters & Trucking
Industry Pension Fund (Teamsters Plan). As a result, SBI became liable for
its proportionate share of the Teamster Plan’s unfunded vested liability.227
The Teamsters Plan asserted that the Sun Capital Funds were jointly and
severally liable for the SBI’s obligations to the Teamsters Plan under the
theory that the Sun Capital Funds were engaged in a ToB and they were in
an ERISA common controlled group with SBI. ERISA did not define ToB or
common control but directed the Federal Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) to prescribe regulations consistent with Treasury
Regulations under Code section 414(c). The PGBC promulgated a regulation
that defined common control as generally 80% or greater common ownership
by vote or value,228 but neither PBGC nor the Treasury Department has
promulgated regulations addressing what constitutes a ToB under ERISA or
the Code. Thus, the main issue was whether the Sun Capital Funds were
engaged in a ToB.
In 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled
that the Sun Capital Funds were not engaged in a ToB and granted summary
judgment in their favor. In 2013, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, unanimously holding that
the Sun Capital Funds were engaged in a ToB, and thus were jointly and
severally liable for the unfunded pension obligations of its portfolio company
(SBI), based on the theory of “investment plus analysis” by which an
otherwise passive investment, when coupled with certain activities, could
cause an investor to be a ToB.229
225

Id. at 1461.
Id.
227 Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (2012). The liability is $4.5 million, greater than the total Sun Funds cash
investment.
228 Congress did not define common control or trade or business under ERISA section
1301(b)(1), but authorized the Federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a
wholly owned U.S. government corporation, to prescribe regulations consistent and
coextensive with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Treasury under the Code section
414(c), which is the tax rules for employee benefit plans maintained by partnerships and
proprietorships that are under common control. However, neither the PBGC nor Treasury has
promulgated regulations addressing what constitutes a “trade or business” for purposes of the
relevant provision of the MPPAA or I.R.C. § 414(c). See Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1461–
62.
229 Id. at 1462; see also Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters &
Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 141 (1st Cir. 2013).
226
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The First Circuit addressed several factors that might satisfy the “plus”
in the investment plus analysis, including the active involvement of the Sun
GP in the management and operation of the portfolio company and the fee
offset arrangement.230 As a matter of fact, the Sun GP actively managed and
operated SBI. The SCAI personnel monitored even the smallest details of
SBI, such as signing all checks for SBI and holding frequent meetings with
senior officers of SBI regarding operation, competition, new products and
personnel.231
It is worth noting a couple of implications of the Sun Capital case for
ToB. First, although the First Circuit’s decision was made for ERISA
purposes only, the definition of “trade or business” under ERISA refers to
the definition of section 414(c) of the Code, so that it would not be surprising
if tax authorities initiated an action to expand the holding to tax cases.232
Since the term “trade or business” for tax purposes refers to active business
operations, such an expansion would challenge PEFs’ fundamental tax
position that they are passive investors.
Second, the court’s ruling on ToB is not limited to the GP’s activity, but
applies to the fund itself. Partnership is a pass-through entity, so that the
partnership does not pay tax and its income flows through to the partners.233
However, when it comes to determining and computing the items of income,
gain, loss, deductions, and credits of the partnership, tax law generally treats
the partnership as an entity to calculate such tax attributes and then has them
pass through to the partners to pay tax.234 In addition, under the law of
partnership, partners are agents of the partnership for carrying on the ordinary
course of the partnership business.235 The general partner is of course an
agent of a limited partnership.236 Thus, the act of any partner is attributable
to the partnership as long as the partner’s act is apparently undertaken within
the scope of the partnership’s ordinary course of business.237 Applying this
partnership rule to determine ToB, the act of a GP (or agent) on behalf of the
partnership (or principal) is attributable to the partnership in determining

Sun Capital, 274 F.3d at 141−42.
Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1462; see also Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 142−43.
232 Fleischer, supra note 143 (expecting that notwithstanding the absence of clear
definition, the concept of “trade or business” under ERISA and the Code are related, so that it
would “not be a big leap to argue that the fund was engaged in a trade or business for tax
purposes”).
233 I.R.C. § 701.
234 I.R.C. § 702(a).
235 ANGELA SCHNEEMAN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
63 (6th ed. 2013).
236 UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 402(a) (2008).
237 SCHNEEMAN, supra note 235.
230
231

2018

Carried Interest and Beyond

461

whether the partnership is engaged in a ToB.238 Accordingly, relying on
Delaware law,239 the First Circuit found that the Sun Funds acted through the
Sun GP as their agent, and attributed the Sun GP’s ToB activities to the Sun
Funds.240 Therefore, the fund itself was treated as engaging in the (active)
ToB (through the activity of the GP,) rather than passively investing in the
portfolio company.
As a result, if all of the fund’s profits are treated as arising from the
fund’s ToB, it would also have an impact on the tax consequences of LPs.
More broadly, the active and professional investment activities conducted by
fund managers have implications not only on the taxation of their carried
interests but also on the overall income of both GPs and LPs. Such active
business activities of PEFs also have an impact on the international tax
consequences of the PEF investments, including those of foreign LPs, which
will be discussed in Part V. The next subpart discusses the domestic tax
consequences of tax-exempt LPs.
3.

Tax-Exempt LPs and the UBTI Rule

Under current law, tax-exempt organizations are exempted from
taxation,241 but their unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) is not
exempted from taxation.242 More specifically, tax-exempt LPs, such as
pension funds, have relied on the rule that dividends, interest, royalties, and
gains or losses from the sale of stock, securities and most other types of assets
are excluded from the UBTI, so that such income is not subject to tax.243
However, if the fund is treated as engaging in ToB, the income of taxexempt LPs could be treated differently. Capital gains are generally
exempted from tax, but gains from the sale of property primarily held for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of the ToB are considered as UBTI,
subject to tax.244 If a partnership’s ToB generates UBTI to an exempt
organization that is a partner of a partnership, the exempt organization (or the
partner) includes its share of the UBTI of the partnership whether or not such
UBTI is distributed.245
Traditionally, the PEF’s assets are treated as being held neither for sale
to customers nor in the course of the ToB.246 However, if PEF investment is
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Commissioner v. Boeing, 106 F.2d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1939).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-301 (1999).
Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1463; see also Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 147.
I.R.C. § 501(a).
I.R.C. § 511(a).
I.R.C. § 512(b)(5).
I.R.C. § 512(b)(5)(B).
I.R.C. § 512(c)(1).
For detailed discussion, see supra Part IV.B.1; Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 363−65
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determined to be ToB, the issue arises of whether the requirement of “to
customers” is satisfied, which is identical to the discussion relating to capital
assets in Subpart B.1. Although the issue is controversial, it is fair to make
an ambitious argument to exclude PEF assets from capital assets if one
underscores the active business nature of PEFs.
More importantly, fundamental policy concerns with regards to taxexempt organizations and the UBTI rule should be considered. In fact, taxexempt entities are generally viewed positively as providing public goods,247
so that they are entitled to be exempt from tax on their investment income as
long as it is not UBTI. Because of the benefits that tax-exempt organizations
contribute to society, Congress exempts them from tax despite the fact that
this exemption could cause unfair competition between taxable entities and
exempt organizations.248 However, Congress added the UBTI rule in 1950
because it decided that income unrelated to the business of the exempt
organizations would be presumed not to further their exempt purpose.249 In
light of that, at least from a policy perspective, whether the tax-exempt LP’s
income from PEF investment should be exempted or taxable as UBTI should
be discussed regardless of the technical “to customer” requirement being
satisfied.
It is hard to blame taxpayers for wanting to optimize their tax
consequences as long as it is legitimate under the current law. It could be
argued that tax-exempt organizations’ investment strategy to avoid UBTI is
not abusive because it falls within an exception of the tax law.250 However,
it is unclear whether the tax-exempt entity’s yet undisclosed strategy of
participating in PEF investments is within the limit of the tax law. First, it is
doubtful whether their investments through PEFs are entirely passive. If the
private equity investment is to be treated as active investment as discussed
above, the tax-exempt entity’s income should be treated as taxable UBTI.
Second, when their tax-exempt status avails other taxpayers of tax games and
exploiting the loophole, it should be subject to criticism and reform. Polsky
has shown that the carried interest loophole exists largely because of the taxindifference of the LPs,251 which will be demonstrated in detail in Part VI. In
addition, other strategies using various fees and expenses have been less
scrutinized by investors because the investors are less sensitive to the tax
strategies designed by managers, as long as the managers make sure to make
(criticizing the traditional position to treat the PEFs’ assets as such).
247 Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the Contract Failure Explanation for Nonprofit
Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1996).
248 Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1469.
249 Id.
250 Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-exempt Investments: Tax Havens, Blocker
Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-financed Income, 106 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 225, 242 (2012).
251 Polsky, supra note 11, at 3–5.
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their income non-UBTI.
Apart from the tax consideration, many tax-exempt LPs have started
inquiring whether their investment in PEF is desirable or consistent with their
interests and values.252 For example, pension funds pursue long-term
stability of their investment strategy, so their investment in PEFs that seek to
maximize short-term gains would not be desirable.253 Furthermore, the
complex relationship between GPs and LPs put the LPs “in an asymmetric or
unequal relationship with [GPs].”254 Thus, some LP organizations, such as
California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the Wisconsin Investment
Board, and the New York City pension fund, decided to disinvest in PEFs.255
While some LPs still prefer to invest in PEFs, a recent survey by Collier
Capital of 140 LPs suggests that 37% of pension plans and 43% of
foundations and endowments wanted to decrease their investment in or
disinvest from PEFs.256
This attitude of LPs implies that tax-exempt LPs’ investment in PEFs
would be at odds with their interests and values. If their investments in PEFs
are undesirable, then there is no longer a legitimate reason to exempt their
PEF investment income from tax from a policy perspective, given that PEF
is to be treated as ToB. Therefore, it is worth considering the policy argument
that tax law should classify the tax-exempt LPs’ investment income from
PEFs as taxable UBTI.
If such LPs’ income is treated as UBTI, then how would it be taxed? The
key question is whether the LPs’ income is capital gains or ordinary income.
The UBTI rule only determines whether the income is taxable, so that the
character of income is still subject to the usual partnership tax rule. Under
current law, because character of partnership gains allocated to partner is
determined at partnership level, the partnership profits from the acquisition
and the subsequent sale of the securities in portfolio companies would be
treated as capital gains for both GPs and LPs.257 However, a more aggressive
policy alternative discussed in Subpart B.1. treats the PEF as a ToB and thus
treats GPs’ and LPs’ income as ordinary.
C. Summary
This part specified three policy alternatives to tax PEFs. The proposal to
tax a GP’s carried interest as ordinary income has gained bipartisan support.
252

EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, PRIVATE EQUITY
STREET MANAGES MAIN STREET 241 (2014).
253 Id.
254 Id. at 240.
255 Id. at 259–60.
256 Id. at 259.
257 I.R.C. § 702(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (2017).
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The second proposal also relates to a GP’s income in connection with
management fees and expenses. The government has proposed a regulation
to treat certain carried interest received in return for a fee waiver arrangement
disguised as payment for services. However, this article suggests that rather
than pursuing management fee reform separately from carried interest
reform, it would be better to enact carried interest reform that may encompass
the management fee issue as well. If the carried interest proposal were
enacted as law, the carried interest payment from the partnership to a GP
would be treated as an ordinary deduction to the partnership and ordinary
income to the GP.
The third alternative is the most ambitious: to treat the entire activity of
a PEF as a ToB. Inasmuch as this article demonstrates that the nature of PEF
investment is active in terms of acquiring at least 10% control of portfolio
companies, this policy alternative is a reasonable deduction under the law of
partnership, attributing a GP’s action to the fund. However, it further affects
an LP’s income, now being earned from an active ToB, which would
probably make income of tax-exempt LPs as UBTI that is subject to tax.
Because the LP’s tax-exempt status is the key to making the private equity
tax game effective, this would be a sensible policy argument. However,
considering the policy goal to exempt income of such tax-exempt
organizations for their positive function to provide public goods, policy
makers should clarify whether Congress still intends to exempt tax or apply
the UBTI rule for those LPs’ investment in PEFs.
V. INTERNATIONAL TAX IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALTERNATIVES
The policy alternatives discussed in Part IV support the hybrid nature of
PEF investment. While PEF investment has the form of portfolio investment,
its substance is more or less active. The difference between the alternatives
is the extent to which the PEF investment is active. Proposals on carried
interest limit the extent to which the GP’s income is active, while treating a
PEF as a ToB ambitiously frames the entire income of the PEF as active.
The issue of recognizing the active business feature of PEFs in the
international tax environment has not received much attention from
international tax experts. The extent of the activeness of PEF investment has
an impact on allocating tax jurisdictions between source and residence
countries in the cross-border context. In general, active business income is
allocated to the source jurisdiction, while passive or portfolio income is
allocated to the residence jurisdiction by the present consensus in
international tax.258 The alternatives recognizing the active nature of the PEF

258

See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
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investment would push the extant line for source-based taxation.259
This might raise a question on why we should impose another layer of
source-based taxation for PEF investment in international tax. I argue that the
way to justify strengthening source-based taxation on a GP’s income would
be different from that on an LP’s income, because a GP actively harms
source-based taxation while an LP connives at the GP’s action at best. Thus,
to what extent we may strengthen source-based taxation for the PEF’s income
must be examined.
Furthermore, considering that developed countries, which are
traditionally conceived as countries of residence, have led the development
of international tax norms,260 the developed countries might not be interested
in recognizing the active nature of PEF investment, which would presumably
result in the loss of their revenue. However, it would be hasty to presume that
the revenue effect of alternatives would be as such. Developed countries,
such as the United States. and those in the European Union, are not
necessarily the residence countries in PEF investment, as demonstrated in
Part II.
The discourse of the nature of PEF investment has already begun, not
only in developing countries or host countries where portfolio companies are
located, but also in developed countries, such as the United States, although
the discourse is still limited to domestic tax issues. It is worth studying this
issue further in the international context since the Sun Capital case
recognized the active business feature of PEF in domestic tax
environment.261 In this part, I present an in-depth analysis of the important
issues in international tax that the alternative perspective toward PEF
investment would implicate. Part VI includes a more detailed analysis on
revenue effects.

259 My argument is different from that of the group of scholars who try to reformulate the
consensus in international tax; that is, the series of scholarship discussing the superiority of
either source or residence as criteria of tax jurisdiction. Some argue in favor of pure residencebased tax; some emphasize the appeal of source-based tax by criticizing the criteria of
residence as inappropriate. See supra notes 164–66. However, my approach is distinguished
from those scholars because I do not directly attack either of the criterions. Instead, I reveal
the hidden nature of the facts in PEF investment and urge for the application of the extant rule
more accurately. At the end of the day, my approach would lead to strengthening source-based
taxation by pushing the line for the benefit of source countries. However, my approach is more
focused on interpreting the fact rather than evaluating the rule.
260 Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259,
307 (2003) (providing that developed countries and the OECD have led the international tax
norms through bilateral tax treaty practice).
261 Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013).
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A. How to Justify Strengthening Source-based Taxation?
Policy alternatives that recognize the hybrid nature of PEF investments
could lead to strengthening source-based taxation as opposed to the status
quo, because the investors’ income would be treated as active income that
would be taxed primarily by the country of source, rather than as passive
income that would have been taxed primarily by the country of residence.
The traditional view that treats the income of PEF investors as passive
would be rooted in the view that, in addition to the tax consequences of PEFs
or its investors, takes the corporate tax to be paid by portfolio companies
located in the host country into account.262 Proponents of this view might
argue that because portfolio companies have paid corporate tax on their
profits derived from the active business performed in the host country, profits
extracted from the investment in portfolio companies — such as capital gains
when investors sell the stock, and dividends — are passive and thus taxed as
passive income. These proponents might ask why we should impose another
layer of source-based taxation on the profits earned by investors solely
because the fund (or the pass-through vehicle) is arguably treated as active,
while we already impose source-based taxation on the profits created by
portfolio companies.
Such criticism relates to the question of how to justify source-based
taxation on the fund’s income paid by portfolio companies, and to what
extent. This subpart examines such justification for GPs’ income and LPs’
income in turn, assuming that GPs and LPs are foreigners of the host country.
1.

GP: Manipulating the Fund’s Income and Eroding the Tax Base of
Portfolio Companies

Portfolio companies pay two types of returns to PEFs: one is the return
of labor (i.e., management service) performed by the PEF’s personnel, and
the other is the return of capital injected by PEFs. A GP receives both types
of return. From the nontax perspective, a large extent of such income relates
to the return of labor. Due to tax loopholes, however, carried interest converts
the return of labor, or ordinary income, into the return of capital, or capital
gains.263 Such conversion of the return’s character could manipulate the
source of income in international tax and thus harm source-based taxation in
the host country.264
262

I am indebted to Professors Linda Sugin and Jeff Colon for this insight.
See supra text accompanying notes 181–200.
264 More precisely, it is not conclusive whether such manipulation harms the sourcebased taxation, because although the primary tax jurisdiction of capital gains is the residence
country, the primary tax jurisdiction of labor income is not always the source country. More
details are discussed infra in Subpart B. In brief, the country where the services are performed
263
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Furthermore, by waiving the management fee, allocating expenses of
funds to management fees, and pushing down the funds’ obligation to pay
management fees to portfolio companies (i.e., fee offset), PEFs strip such
return to the management function out of the portfolio companies’ profits.265
The reduced corporate tax base of the portfolio companies as such would
have been subject to source-based taxation. This is an example of earningsstripping in international tax, which is another major strategy to erode sourcebased taxation. The United States has taken earnings-stripping seriously and
tried to restrict it by, for example, adding section 163(j) to the Code as part
of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989.266
In other words, we are observing both tax-base stripping and the
conversion of character simultaneously. On both accounts, GPs are culpable
for eroding source-based taxation in international tax. Therefore, it justifies
expanding source-based taxation on GPs’ income by treating the PEF
investment as active.
2.

LP: Status Enabling the PEF’s Tax Game

On the LP’s side, the accusation is quite different. An LP’s income is
purely the return of capital, which is passive investment income unless the
laws of partnership and partnership tax apply. In international tax, passive
income of foreign investors, such as capital gains of foreign LPs, are not
generally taxed by the host country, but it will eventually be taxed (or
exempted from tax) according to the law of the country where the foreign

has primary tax jurisdiction for the compensation of service. In order not to trigger source
country’s primary tax jurisdiction on labor income, fund managers try to provide management
services offshore. However, it is often inevitable to provide the service in the host country if
the fund managers are actively engaged in the operation of portfolio companies, as shown in
the Sun Capital case. For those cases, converting the character of GP’s income result in the
change of primary tax jurisdiction of such income and harm source-based taxation of the host
country.
265 Management fee waiver, expense allocation, and fee offset are GPs’ strategy to
reduce their compensation paid by the fund and instead to increase their compensation paid by
portfolio companies. The fund has earned economic benefit because it has saved expenses due
to the portfolio companies’ payment to GPs and their affiliated management firms, while the
portfolio companies have suffered economic loss due to such payment. See Berkowitz &
Duran, supra note 203, at 673–74 (showing that Sun Capital case has noted a direct economic
benefit of the fund due to the fee offset arrangement). This reduced profits of portfolio
companies would have constituted corporate tax base that is payable to the source country
where portfolio companies are located.
266 GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 288. For a recent discussion on the earningsstripping relating to corporate inversions, see J. Clifton Fleming, Robert J. Peroni & Stephen
E. Shay, Getting Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical
Framework, 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015).
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investors reside.267 Such nonresident status of foreign LPs is equivalent to a
domestic LP’s tax-exempt status in terms that both statuses enable the private
equity tax game conducted by GPs. However, the policy alternatives that
recognize the hybrid nature of PEF investment would change the primary tax
jurisdiction of foreign LP’s income from the country of residence to the
country of source, because if the fund is treated as engaging in active business
in the host country, both GPs and LPs are treated as engaging in such active
business, resulting in the foreign LP’s income being subject to the sourcebased taxation.268
Although the entire PEF and its investors (including foreign LPs) would
be treated as engaging in active ToB under the law of partnership and
partnership tax,269 LPs are not themselves actively involved in any such
activities. They do not provide management service to portfolio companies,
nor do they convert the character of their income or strip the earnings of the
portfolio companies. The only reason LPs are responsible for the private
equity tax game is because of their nonresident status availing other taxpayers
of tax games and exploiting the loopholes.
In short, foreign LPs are responsible for the private equity tax game not
because of their actions but because of their status. Specifically, an LP’s
status relates more strongly to a GP’s converting the character of income, and
relatively less to the GP’s earnings-stripping. Despite the fact that LPs play
the tax game, the justification for strengthening source-based taxation of LPs
would be less convincing considering the LP’s inherent passive nature.
Furthermore, if such foreign LPs would eventually be taxable in the residence
country, it would be more or less unreasonable to change the primary tax
jurisdiction of LP’s income just because of the GP’s action.270
However, such criticism should first overcome the law of partnership
and partnership tax law that attributes a GP’s activity to the entire fund.271
As long as the fund is treated as engaging in active business, income
attributable to foreign LPs is also active, with the result of expanding sourcebased taxation. From a policy perspective, it is fair to argue that international
tax law should allow residence-based taxation on an LP’s portion of income
even if the nature of a PEF’s investment is active. However, given that PEF
267

Needham, supra note 61, at 1219–30.
See infra Subpart C.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 233–40.
270 It would be the same even if the LPs are tax-exempt in their home country, because it
is the policy decision made by the residence country, which has nothing to do with the source
country.
271 See Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 402 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2013); Johnston v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 920 (1955) (individual partner in Canadian partnership that invested
in partnership engaged in U.S. business treated as engaged in trade or business); Rosenthal,
supra note 7, at 365 n.43.
268
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investment is treated as active ToB, it would be difficult for LPs to keep the
passive nature of their income under current law as long as they take
advantage of investing in a pass-through vehicle.
B. Foreign GPs: Where Are the Services Performed?
Subparts B and C examine specific international tax issues discussed in
Subpart A in greater detail. Let us assume a cross-border investment by a
PEF. In a case of inbound investment, the PEF acquires stocks or securities
of U.S. corporations,272 and the partners, including the fund manager who is
a GP, are based in a foreign country. In a case of outbound investment, the
PEF acquires stocks or securities of foreign corporations, and the partners,
including the GP fund manager, are based in the United States. The fund
manager provides management services to the portfolio companies and
receives a 2% management fee and 20% carried interest from the fund. Under
current law, carried interest is treated as capital gains of the fund manager,
while the management fee is considered ordinary income (more specifically
compensation for services). For discussion purposes, whether the PEF
constitutes a ToB is ignored for now.
In a case of inbound investment, if the foreign GP’s income is not
effectively connected with a U.S. ToB, most of her U.S. source income is
subject to a 30% flat tax on the gross amount, while her foreign source
income is not subject to U.S. taxation. Most types of ordinary income other
than business profits, such as “interest . . . dividends, rents, wages,
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or determinable
annual or periodical gains, profits, and income” are subject to such 30%
tax,273 and collectively referred to as “FDAP income.”274 The Code’s source
determination rules regarding compensation for services hold that the income
is sourced where the services are performed.275 Hence, if the foreign GP
performs management services offshore, such income is not subject to U.S.
taxation, while if she performs services in the United States, such income is
subject to U.S. taxation.276
On the other hand, gains from the sale of U.S. personal property,
including stock of U.S. corporations (i.e., capital gains), are not treated as

272

Here, which country the fund has been established does not matter in most cases,
because the fund is a pass-through entity and does not pay tax.
273 I.R.C. §§ 871(a) (nonresident aliens), 881(a) (foreign corporations).
274 GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 228.
275 I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(3), 862(a)(3).
276 If services are performed partly within and partly without the United States,
compensation will be apportioned between U.S. and foreign sources. Treas. Reg. § 1.8614(b)(1)(i) (2005).
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FDAP income.277 Furthermore, such capital gains realized by a foreign
person who was not present in the United States for 183 days or more in the
tax year are not taxed even when they derive from the stock of U.S.
corporations, because it is likely treated as foreign source.278
The analysis of the outbound investment is similar. Most countries’ tax
treaties and laws allocate tax jurisdiction of compensation for services to the
source country, and that of capital gains to the residence country.279 The
source of compensation is the jurisdiction where the services are performed,
while that of capital gains arising from the stock sale is where the taxpayer
resides.
Therefore, if the proposals on carried interest to tax compensation as
ordinary income were enacted as law, the question of where the services are
performed would necessarily follow.
Traditionally, fund managers try to perform services in their home
country and avoid performing services in the host country by not staying 183
days or more in the host country in a given year.280 This is intended to avoid
the source rule of compensation for their management fee portion, as well as
to avoid becoming a tax resident of the host country for their carried interest
portion. However, it is often inevitable to provide their services in the host
country if the fund managers are actively engaged in the operation of the
portfolio companies, in which case both the GP’s management fee and
carried interest would be subject to the host country’s taxation.
C. Foreign LPs
1.

Effectively Connected Income with a Trade or Business

Let us assume that foreign LPs invest in a PEF, which acquires stocks or
securities of U.S. corporations.281 When the PEF sells the stocks or securities
of portfolio companies, capital gains realized by foreign investors are treated
as passive investment income under current law, so that they are generally
not taxed even when they derive from the sale of the U.S. corporations’
stock.282 In the language of international tax, capital gains realized by the
PEF and then attributed to foreign LPs are not effectively connected with a

277

Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (2017).
GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 261 n.1.
279 See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, Feb. 17, 2016, art. 14, 15; supra text
accompanying notes 275, 278.
280 See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, Feb. 17, 2016, art. 14, 15.
281 Here, which country the fund has been established does not matter in most cases,
because the fund is a pass-through entity and does not pay tax.
282 Needham, supra note 61, at 1230.
278
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U.S. ToB, and thus they are not generally taxed.283 That income will
eventually be taxed according to the tax law of the country where the foreign
LPs reside.
However, if such capital gains are effectively connected income (ECI)
— that is, connected with the conduct of a ToB within the United States —
they are subject to U.S. taxation at the usual tax rates.284 The term ECI in
international tax generally refers to the income arising from active business
activities, or ToB.285 In other words, active business income, or ECI with the
U.S. ToB, is subject to the U.S. taxation, whereas passive investment income
is subject to the taxation of the residence country. This U.S. international tax
rule accords with the active/passive distinction in international tax norms.286
If the fund is treated as engaging in a ToB within the United States, the
current tax position of foreign LPs that their capital gains are not ECI would
be endangered. When a GP’s active management of the portfolio companies
on behalf of the partnership is attributable to the partnership, the partnership
is treated as engaging in ToB.287 Furthermore, once the partnership is
determined to conduct a ToB in the United States, each partner — whether
LP or GP — is deemed to be engaged in the U.S. ToB.288 Therefore, if a PEF
is treated as a ToB, foreign LPs would also be treated as conducting a U.S.
ToB, with the result that their income would be ECI and no longer exempted
from U.S. taxation.
However, there is a safe harbor even if an investor is considered to have
a U.S. ToB. When an “investor” holding stocks and securities is determined
to have a ToB, such investor usually wants to be treated as a “trader” of stocks
and securities, which is a slightly more active type of stock holder than an
investor.289 The Code provides foreign taxpayers with a safe harbor for
283 GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 261. However, if the foreign person was present
in the United States for 183 days or more during the taxable year, the capital gains are subject
to 30% tax. I.R.C. § 871(a)(2).
284 I.R.C. § 871(b)(1). Here, the net income, not the gross amount, is subject to tax. To
explain more technically, gains from the sale of U.S. personal property, including stock of
U.S. corporations (i.e., capital gains) are not treated as FDAP income. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (2017). Furthermore, non-ECI capital gains realized by foreign person who
was not present in the United States for 183 days or more are not taxed even when they derive
from U.S. sources, because it is likely treated as foreign source. (Sometimes, source is
determined by the taxpayers’ residence.) However, if capital gains are ECI with U.S. ToB, it
is likely to be treated as U.S. source, subject to U.S. tax at usual tax rates.
285 I.R.C. §§ 871(b)(1), 882(a)(1).
286 See supra text accompanying notes 127–30.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 233–40.
288 I.R.C. § 875(a).
289 For three classes of stock holders, see supra note 214. Traders’ activities are more
active than those of investors in terms that they have a ToB, but stocks and securities held by
both investors and traders are considered as capital assets. Both earn income from the
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trading stocks or securities (“trading safe harbor”) under which the foreign
person will not be considered to be engaged in the U.S. ToB.290
Traditionally, the foreign investors in PEF have asserted that they
qualify for the trading safe harbor, so that regardless of whether the fund is
treated as having a U.S. ToB, their investment income from PEF would not
be ECI and would be exempted from U.S. taxation. However, whether the
trading safe harbor would protect the investment activities of PEFs is no
longer certain because of a recent IRS opinion. In January 2015, the IRS
released a Chief Counsel Advice (CCA) memorandum, which concluded that
an offshore PEF was engaged in a ToB in the United States as a consequence
of the fund’s lending and underwriting activities, which were conducted on
behalf of the offshore fund by a fund manager based in the United States.291
The CCA memorandum rejected the application of the trading safe harbor
because it found that the nature of the fund’s business was (active) lending
and underwriting activities, and that “those activities were neither investment
activities nor trading in stocks or securities.”292
The CCA memorandum provides some insight into the overarching
argument of this article. First, the U.S. tax authorities would be more
comfortable and ready to recognize in tax cases that the entire PEF would be
engaging in a U.S. ToB if the GP were involved in active business. Second,
the type of ToB conducted by the GP and the PEF would be determined by
the nature of such activity, rather than simply classified as trading stocks or
securities.
This case suggests that by recognizing PEF as a ToB, the United States
could raise its revenue as a source country in the case of inbound investment.
In contrast, the revenue could decrease in outbound investment cases, where
the United States would be a residence country. However, the United States
is the largest destination market of private equity investment, absorbing more
than 40% of private equity investment worldwide.293 That is, unlike the
traditional notion that the United States is a country of residence, it is more
likely a country of source in PEF investments. Thus, the policy alternative of
treating PEF as a ToB could raise U.S. revenue in the aggregate. These

appreciation of the stock price. Dealers are the most active class of stock holders. They earn
income not from the appreciated stock, but from the fees or mark-ups in excess of the stock
price.
290 I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii).
291 I.R.S., supra note 17.
292 Id. at 23. The CCA memorandum added that even if the fund’s lending and
underwriting activities constitutes trading activities, the fund would not have qualified for the
Trading Safe Harbor, because (i) the fund manager acting as an agent of the fund had
discretionary authority, and (ii) its underwriting activities made the fund a dealer in stocks and
securities rather than a trader. Id. at 15–23.
293 See supra text accompanying Table 1.
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revenue effects will be discussed further in Part VI.
2.

Effect of Tax Treaty – Permanent Establishment

What if there is a tax treaty between the source country where a PEF has
a ToB and the residence country where LPs reside? Section 894(a)(1) of the
Code states that the Code applies “to any taxpayer with due regard to any
treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer.”294
Since most U.S. persons’ cross-border investment and business activities are
engaged in foreign countries with which the United States has entered into
bilateral tax treaties, treaty analysis is almost always necessary to complete
the U.S. international tax analysis.295
If a foreign taxpayer derives ECI from a U.S. ToB, the net income is
subject to U.S. taxation at the usual rate. However, tax treaties provide that
such business income is not subject to the U.S. taxation unless the foreign
taxpayer carries on the U.S. ToB through a “permanent establishment” (PE)
to which the income is attributable.296 A PE is defined as a fixed place of
business through which the business of a foreign enterprise is carried on.297
Income attributable to a PE is subject to tax in the source country. Thus,
generally speaking, income attributable to a PE under tax treaties is
equivalent to ECI for a U.S. ToB under the Code, which describes active
business income in international tax. With respect to the income not
effectively connected with a U.S. ToB, the foreign taxpayer is not considered
to have a PE in the United States.298
Thus, if a PEF is treated as engaging in U.S. ToB, such income may be
considered ECI and attributed to the PE in the United States under tax

294

I.R.C. § 894(a)(1).
GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 181.
296 See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, Feb. 17, 2016, art. 5 (Permanent
Establishment), 7 (Business Profits).
297 Article 5 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty provides that a PE can be found when
there is a fixed place of business through which the business is carried on. See id. at art. 5(1).
This includes a place of management, a branch, an office, a factory, a workshop, etc., while it
excludes such fixed place of business from PE if its overall activities are only preparatory or
auxiliary. See id. at art. 5(2), (4).
Furthermore, if an agent in the United States is acting on behalf of a foreign enterprise and has
and habitually exercises in the United States an authority to conclude contracts that binds on
the enterprise, that foreign enterprise is deemed to have a PE. In this case, the agent herself
constitutes a PE of such foreign enterprise even if the agent does not act through a fixed place
of business. See id. at art. 5(5). However, if the agent is a broker, general commission agent,
or any other agent of independent state, the agent is not treated as a deemed PE. See id. at art.
5(6).
298 I.R.C. § 894(b).
295
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treaties. Then the income flows through to non-U.S. investors,299 making
them subject to U.S. tax and resulting in less favorable tax consequences for
foreign LPs.300 However, under the traditional tax position, neither the fund
nor foreign LPs are considered to earn active business income, which
impedes further analysis of PE in the cross-border investment by PEFs.
Nonetheless, the question of whether a PEF conducting cross-border
investment could have a PE in the source country has been repeatedly
discussed in tax cases relating to PEF in foreign countries, such as the Loan
Star Fund case301 and the Standard Chartered Bank case (involving
Newbridge Capital Group L.L.C.)302 in South Korea.

299

If a partnership operates a business through a PE, the tax consequences of such
partnership are generally attributable to partners as if each partner had the PE. Rev. Rul. 9080, 1990-2 C.B. 170.
300 I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882; see Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1469; see also McBurney,
supra note 143.
301 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Du5950, Jan. 27, 2012 (S. Kor.).
302 Seoul Administrative Court [Seoul Admin. Ct.], 2008Guhap17110, Dec. 30, 2009,
aff’d, Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.] 2010Nu3826 (2010), rev’d, S. Ct., 2010Du20966
(2013) (S. Kor.). The permanent establishment issue was discussed at the Seoul Administrative
Court level.
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FIGURE 6. STRUCTURE OF THE LONE STAR FUND CASE303

VI. REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES
This Part discusses possible revenue effects when two different
alternatives to the taxation of PEF apply instead of the status quo, where all
PEF profits are treated as passive investment income (scenario 1).304
Recasting carried interest from capital gains into ordinary income as
compensation is the first representative alternative (scenario 2), and treating
the PEF’s entire profits — regardless of the GP’s share or LPs’ share — as
ordinary income arising from ToB is the second representative alternative
(scenario 3).
Starting from the domestic revenue effects of the two alternatives, this
part expands the analysis to the international tax environment to examine
303
304

Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Du5950, Jan. 27, 2012 (S. Kor.).
This Part ignores management fees to simplify the analysis.
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how the revenue of each country would be affected by each alternative. Since
multiple fiscs are involved in international tax, it is important to recognize
which fisc is losing in the international PEF investment. This helps to explain
the motivation and reaction of relevant countries to the reform alternatives.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 is not likely to change the analysis
in this Part. As to the domestic analysis, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017
introduces the three-year holding period for carried interest, which may not
effectively close the current loophole.305 It further reduces the effective tax
rates for partnership income by allowing partners to deduct an amount equal
to 20% of certain qualified business income (QBI) from a ToB conducted by
a partnership.306 This new deduction only applies to income from a ToB,
which does not include income earned as an employee or payment for
services rendered, and phases out if taxable income is above a specific
amount.307 Since GPs’ income is either paid as an employee or likely to be
above the specific amount, and LPs are mostly tax-exempt, the new QBI
deduction appears to be irrelevant.308
As to the international analysis, the United States was — until recently
— one of the few OECD countries that used a worldwide system of
international taxation where a U.S. resident corporation was subject to U.S.
taxation on all its active income earned abroad or domestically.309 The Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 changed the worldwide system to a territorial
system. Under this international tax system, dividends received by a U.S.
corporation from foreign subsidiaries in which the U.S. corporation has at
least a 10% interest are generally exempted from tax.310 However, this so-
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See supra Part IV.A.
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §11011, 131 Stat. 2054, 2063−71
(2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §199A).
307 I.R.C. § 199A(c), (d). For 2018, the QBI deduction starts phasing out if taxable
income is above $157,500 for a single taxpayer and $315,500 for a married couple filing
jointly, and phases out in full if taxable income is above $207,500 for a single taxpayer and
$415,500 for a married couple filing jointly. I.R.C. § 199A(d)(3).
308 However, since the eligibility of the new pass-through tax rate is susceptible to tax
games, there might be a creative way for LPs and GPs to further exploit the new QBI
deduction, which is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., David Kamin et al., The Games
They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the New Legislation (Dec. 7,
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3084187.
309 In 2015, all but seven OECD countries (Chile, Ireland, Israel, Mexico, Poland, South
Korea, and the United States) have adopted a territorial system for taxing corporations’ foreign
active earnings. Rosanne Altshuler et al., Lessons the United States Can Learn from Other
Countries’ Territorial Systems for Taxing Income of Multinational Corporations, TAX POL’Y
CTR.,
URB.
INST.
&
BROOKINGS
INST.
10
(Jan.
21,
2015),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/2000077-lessons-the-us-can-learn-fromother-countries.pdf.
310 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §14101, 139 Stat. 2054, 2189−92
306

2018

Carried Interest and Beyond

477

called participation exemption rule does not apply to dividends received by
noncorporate taxpayers, such as PEFs and their individual partners.311
Therefore, it is not likely to matter substantially whether a home country has
a worldwide tax system or territorial tax system when analyzing the
international revenue effects of the above three scenarios.312
A. Domestic Effects: GP’s Carried Interest and Tax-Exempt LPs
Current reform proposals on carried interest mostly focus on the GP’s
activity and the character of its income — capital gains vs. ordinary income
as compensation. However, it is important to note that, unless LPs are taxexempt, converting the character of carried interest only relates to the
distribution of tax on a given PEF income among LPs and GPs, and does not
affect the overall revenue.313 In other words, since most LPs are tax-exempt,
the conversion of ordinary income as compensation into capital gains as
carried interest results in the loss of revenue. Below is an example
demonstrating such revenue effects, which is developed from the example
that Polsky demonstrated in his recent paper.314
Assume that a private equity fund realizes $100 in capital gains (CG)
and pays $20 in carried interest to the GP in Scenario 1, where all PEF income
is treated as passive investment income. Assume further that CG are taxed at
a 20% rate and ordinary income (OI) is taxed at a 40% rate315 in Country A,
where all LPs, GP, managers, and the portfolio company (PC) are located.
Capital loss (CL) can only offset CG, and ordinary deduction (OD) can offset
OI, so CL can save tax at a 20% rate and OD can save tax at a 40% rate. The
GP obtains $20 CG (20% of $100), subject to $4 of tax (20% x $20), and the

(2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 245A).
311 Factor & Fedida, supra note 10, at 5−6.
312 First, the fund is a partnership or pass-through vehicle, so it is not subject to the
corporate tax system where the distinction between worldwide and territorial matters. Second,
a substantial portion of investors are tax-exempt entities in their home countries. Third,
managers who pay tax to home countries are subject to individual income tax, which does not
differ in either territorial or worldwide tax system.
313 Polsky, supra note 11, at 4.
314 Id. at 4–5. The numbers of income and losses are the same as the example used in
Polsky’s paper. However, the revenue analysis with specific tax rate is done by the author.
Although Polsky argues that by converting the incentive fee to carried interest managers win,
the investors do not lose because of their tax indifference, and only the fisc loses on an overall,
net basis, he does not clearly show the revenue effects caused by such conversion, which
inspires the author to conduct that analysis.
315 The example assumes a 40% tax rate based on the top marginal tax rate of 39.6%
under previous tax law. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reduced the top marginal tax rate to 37%,
effective January 1, 2018. To keep the examples simple, this article continues to assume a 40%
tax rate for ordinary income and deduction.
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LP obtains the remaining $80 CG. If LPs are taxable, they are subject to $16
of tax (20% x $80), and the total revenue would be $20. However, since LPs
are tax-exempt, LP is not obliged to pay $16 of tax, and the total revenue
would be only $4.
In scenario 2, assume the same, but here the fund pays $20 as
compensation for services to the GP. The GP obtains $20 OI, subject to $8
of tax (40% x $20). However, the LPs earn $100 CG (100% of $100 profits).
If LPs are taxable, then they would be subject to $20 of tax on that income
(20% x $100), but they should pay $20 compensation to GP, resulting in $20
of OD. Assuming that LPs have plenty of OI from other sources to use the
entire $20 OD, this OD saves the LPs $8 of tax (40% x $20). The total
revenue would be the same $20 as in scenario 1. However, since LPs are taxexempt, tax consequences of the LPs should be ignored, resulting in $8 of
total revenue.
TABLE 4. REVENUE ANALYSIS (DOMESTIC)

Scenario 1:
Carried Interest
as CG

GP’s
income

GP’s tax
consequences
(①)

LPs’
income

LPs’ tax
consequences
(②)

$20
CG

$4 tax

$80
CG

LPs are
taxexempt
If LPs
are
taxable
LPs are
taxexempt
If LPs
are
taxable

Scenario 2:
Carried Interest
as Compensation
(OI)

$20 OI

Scenario 3: All
profits are from
active business
income

$20 OI

$8 tax

$8 tax

$100
CG &
($20
OD)

$100
OI &
($20
OD)

LPs are
taxable

-

$16
tax

Total tax
revenue
(=① +
②)
$4 (③)

$20 (④)

-

$20
tax &
$8 tax
saving
$32
tax

$8 (⑤)

$20 (⑥)

$40 (⑦)

Comparing scenarios 1 and 2 shows that if the LPs are taxable, then
changing the character of compensation to carried interest would cause
different tax consequences for the GP than the LPs. This change benefits the
GP and harms the LPs, but the total revenue would be the same (compare ④
and ⑥). However, if the LP is tax-exempt, tax benefit and detriment do not
precisely offset each other because of the tax-indifference of the LPs. The
character swap benefits the GP by reducing tax from $8 to $4, while the LPs
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are neutral in tax liability due to its tax-indifferent status. Only the revenue
reduces by the amount that the GP obtains in tax benefits (compare ③ and
⑤).
This example shows that the carried interest loophole is substantially
attributed to the tax-exempt LPs.316 However, the solution of the current
reform proposals is likely to recast carried interest into ordinary income and
increase the GP’s tax amount, say from $4 to $8 in the above example. Yet,
it does not consider whether the role of the LPs and their tax-exempt status
in the private equity tax game is justified.
Then, what if PEF is a ToB and all profits are treated as ordinary income
(scenario 3)? The GP obtains $20 OI, subject to $8 of tax (40% x $20). LPs
earn $100 OI (100% of $100 profits) and $20 OD, resulting from the $20
compensation to GP. LPs would no longer be tax-exempt because all PEF
profits are OI. Therefore, LPs are subject to $32 of tax (40% x $80).
In addition to the common recovery of the $20 revenue due to the
recapture of the LP’s income as UBTI, the fisc additionally wins by $12 and
$16, respectively, compared to scenarios 1 and 2 (compare ③ and ⑦, and
⑤ and ⑦). The revenue effect in scenario 3 relative to scenarios 1 and 2 is
much more significant than the difference between scenarios 1 and 2. In sum,
total revenue is worse off as income arising from PEF investment is treated
more as passive income, and it is even further worse off compared to the
hypothetical total revenue where LPs are taxable.
B. International Effects
As to the example in Subpart A, it is fair to say that the overall revenue
effects rely on the tax policy of Country A, so that the fisc is responsible for
the loss caused by its own tax policy. It is capable of fixing the system at will.
On the other hand, in the cross-border investments by PEFs, there are
multiple fiscs involved, which means that the fisc that allows the carried
interest loophole and the exemption status of the investors is different from
the fisc that loses the revenue due to the PEF tax policy.
To compare the above three scenarios in the international domain,
assume now that all LPs are tax-exempt entities located in Country A, while
the PC is located in Country B. The GP and the fund managers are also
residents of Country A, but they conduct the investment activities, including
their service at the board of the PC, in Country B. There is a tax treaty
between Countries A and B, whereby capital gains are taxed by the residence
country or home country only, and compensation for service or employment
is taxed by the country where the service or employment is exercised. Both
countries tax CG at a 20% rate and OI at a 40% rate. Assuming that LPs have
316

Polsky, supra note 11, at 5.
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plenty of OI from other sources to use the entire $20 OD, the OD saves the
LPs $8 of tax (40% x $20).
TABLE 5. REVENUE ANALYSIS (INTERNATIONAL)
Income subject to
Country A’s
Taxation
(Residence
Country)

Revenu
e of
Countr
yA
(①)

Income
subject
to
Countr
y B’s
Taxatio
n
(Source
Countr
y)
No
income,
no tax

Revenu
e of
Countr
yB
(②)

Total
worldwi
de
revenue
(=①+
②)

0 (④)

$4 (⑤)

Scenario 1:
Carried
Interest as
CG
(All profits
are passive
income)

LPs
are
taxexem
pt
If LPs
are
taxabl
e

GP: $20 carried
interest (CG) $4
tax
LPs: $80 CGno
tax
GP: $20 CG  $4
tax
LPs: $80 CG 
$16 tax

$4
(③)

$20
(⑥)

No
income,
no tax

0 (⑦)

$20 (⑧)

Scenario 2:
Carried
interest as
Compensati
on (OI)

LPs
are
taxexem
pt
If LPs
are
taxabl
e

LPs: $100 CG &
$20 OD
no tax

0 (⑨)

GP:
$20
OI$8
tax

$8
(⑩)

$8 (⑪)

LPs: $100 CG &
$20 OD
 $12 tax

$12
(⑫)

GP:
$20
OI$8
tax

$8
(⑬)

$20 (⑭)

LPs
are
taxabl
e

No income,
no tax

0 (⑮)

GP:
$20 OI
 $8
tax
LP:
$80 OI
 $32
tax

$40
(⑯)

$40 (⑰)

Scenario 3:
All profits
are from
active
business
income

In the first scenario, where all profits are treated as capital gains derived
from passive investment, Country B does not collect any revenue from this
investment. Country A would collect $20 tax from this investment if the LPs
were taxable ($16 tax from the income of LPs and $4 tax from carried
interest), but it can only collect $4 from carried interest.
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In the second scenario, where carried interest is treated as ordinary
income for services, Country B can collect $8 tax from carried interest.
However, Country A does not collect any tax from the income of the taxexempt LP, while it could collect $12 tax if the LPs were taxable and had
plenty of OI from other sources to use the entire $20 OD.
In the third scenario, where all profits of the PEF are active business
income, Country A does not collect any tax, while Country B exercises
primary tax jurisdiction on all income from this active business and collects
$40 in tax revenue.
Country A (the home country) is losing more revenue as more income
arising from private equity investment is treated as active or ordinary income
(compare ③, ⑨, and ⑮), while Country B (the host country) is losing more
revenue as more income arising from private equity investment is treated as
passive investment income (compare ⑯, ⑩, and ④). However, both
countries’ tax benefits and detriments do not offset each other because of the
tax-indifference of the LPs. For example, while Country B would gain $8
more revenue by moving from scenario 1 to 2, Country A would lose only $4
of revenue (compare ⑩ and ③).
In addition, total worldwide revenue is also worse off as income arising
from private equity investment is treated more as passive income (compare
⑰, ⑪, and ⑤). It is even further worse off when compared to the
hypothetical worldwide revenue where LPs are taxable (compare ⑧ and ⑤,
and ⑭ and ⑪).
As such, the issue of fiscs losing in the private equity tax game becomes
more complicated in the international domain. If it were a single jurisdiction
case in Subpart A, the relevant government may control whether it would fix
the policy or endure the revenue loss for the sake of other policy goals, such
as promoting exempt organizations or attracting more foreign investment.
However, in the international domain, the government pursuing such other
policy goals is different from the government suffering from the resulting
revenue loss. Furthermore, because of the tax-indifferent investors, a home
country is less susceptible to the private equity tax games, while a host
country is more susceptible to them. This phenomenon is not limited to the
issues of the character of carried interest or the active/passive nature of
private equity investment. The monitoring fee offset, interest deductions, and
debt push-downs to PCs also harm the revenue of host countries, whereas the
home countries are less susceptible as long as the LPs are tax-indifferent.
Whether the alternatives to the PEF taxation would negatively affect the
U.S. tax revenue is not certain. Some would prefer the status quo in scenario
1 if they consider the United States as the traditional country of residence as
shown in Figure 6.
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FIGURE 6. GPS’ JURISDICTIONS AND EMERGING MARKET LPS’
JURISDICTIONS317

However, it would be hasty to presume the revenue loss of the United
States, because it is necessary to take into account bilateral cashflows in order
to determine the precise revenue effect. In fact, developed countries are major
source countries as well as major residence countries in the PEF industry.
Figure 7 shows the rank of source countries where international PEF
investments are deployed. Advanced economies, such as the United States
and the United Kingdom, are dominant source countries in PEF
investment.318 Hence, the precise revenue effect of any given country is
theoretically indeterminate, to the extent that a country, like the United
States, is simultaneously acting as a residence and source country.
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This chart was created using Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4.
The United States is the largest destination market, absorbing 41% of private
investment worldwide, followed by the United Kingdom and non-U.K. Europe. See text
accompanying supra note 82, Table 1.
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FIGURE 7. DESTINATION MARKET (SOURCE COUNTRIES)319

This Subpart has conducted a numerical exercise on a marginal revenue
effect among relevant countries. This article further urges experts to conduct
empirical studies on the macroeconomic revenue effects of the PEF tax
reform by incorporating data on bilateral cash flows. The result is
theoretically ambiguous. However, because traditional residence countries
with advanced economies are source countries at the same time, it is expected
that determining the true nature of PEF investments and reforming PEF tax
accordingly would increase worldwide revenue without significantly
reducing the revenue of traditional residence countries.
More fundamentally, scenarios 2 or 3 are normatively superior in light
of international tax theory. These alternatives allocate tax jurisdiction more
accurately than the status quo because they envisage the nature of PEF
investment more squarely in the cross-border context. However, the policy
choice between scenarios 2 and 3 would not be simple, due to the conflicting
policy goals for LPs. In that regard, the tax effect analysis in this subpart
provides a guideline for the government to perform revenue cost analysis of
those alternatives.
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This chart was created using data from Table 1.
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VII. CONCLUSION
PEF investment has been treated as a passive portfolio investment
despite the fact that it acquires at least 10% equity of portfolio companies,
which is seemingly active. The true nature of PEF investment is in fact
hybrid: a PEF seeks to acquire control over portfolio companies, just like
active direct investment does, while it uses a pass-through vehicle subject to
partnership tax, thereby taking the form of passive investment.
The goal of partnership tax is to achieve tax neutrality between direct
and indirect investment by not imposing entity-level taxation. Current tax law
on PEFs does not perfectly accomplish this tax neutrality because a PEF
converts the active business income into passive investment income.
However, the flaws could be cured by modifying the partnership tax rule
applicable to PEFs, both domestically and internationally, to reflect the
nature of the PEF more precisely. Finding the true nature of PEF investment
and reforming PEF tax accordingly would not reduce the revenue of
traditional residence countries, but it would significantly increase the revenue
of source countries. Thus, the overall worldwide revenue would be expected
to increase.
Given that a pass-through tax regime is the normatively proper system
for taxing PEFs, the discussion of reform in this article envisions two
simplified model environments: a single jurisdiction for domestic tax
analysis and bilateral jurisdictions for international tax analysis. International
tax norms and treaties that allocate tax jurisdiction according to active and
passive distinction are also bilateral solutions. In reality, however, most
cross-border investment by PEFs involves at least three countries, not two —
(1) a residence country (or home country) where investors are located, (2) a
source country (or host country) where portfolio companies are located, and
(3) an intermediary jurisdiction where investment vehicles (and particularly
holding companies) are located. Since the alternatives in this article are still
confined to the bilateral model, further research of the problem in the context
of the multinational environment is needed to propose a more comprehensive
and effective reform.

